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HOSTILE SHARE ACQUISITIONS AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE: A FRAMEWORK FOR EVALUATING
ANTITAKEOVER ACTIVITIESt
John H. Matheson*
Jon R. Norberg**
In recent years, there has been a significant increase in the number of hostile share
acquisitions of American businesses. The authors examine the validity of the various defen-
sive measures employed by target companies to defeat or deter a hostile takeover bid. They
argue that antitakeover activity should not be viewed as a separate subset of legal analysis,"
rather, it should be analyzed according to four traditional principles of corporate governance:
(1) the discretion afforded corporate management by the business judgment rule" (2) the
prohibition against discriminating between members of the same class of shareholders; (3) the
prohibition against shifting control from the shareholders to the board of directors for actions
reserved by statute to the shareholders; and (4) the prohibition against shifting control from a
majority to a minority of shareholders for decisions reserved by statute to the majority.
Moreover, the authors assert that even if a court uses these principles of corporate govern-
ance as the basis for its decision, the court's analysis is still incomplete if itfocuses only on the
target board's initial decision to resist a hostile share acquisition. Rather, a court must under-
take a two-step analysis, whereby it looks first at the target board's initial decision to resist the
hostile takeover, and second, to the means employed by the target board to effectuate that
decision.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade a wave of hostile share acquisitions has
swept over American business, leaving almost no industry untouched.
Whether implemented by tender offer, market purchases or private
arrangements, the prize sought is corporate control. Innovative forms
of financing and changes in the banking climate make it now possible
for acquiring entities to raise billions of dollars in a matter of weeks.
Only the mightiest and best-managed corporate giants have the ability
to ride the wave without fear for their own independence.
Corporate management, concerned for their corporation's con-
tinued independence, their shareholders' investment interests, and
their own positions has been equally innovative in developing new
ways to fend off unwanted overtures. The defensive actions taken by
target management, in the face of a current threat to corporate con-
trol, have a colorful assortment of names-such as the Pac-man
counter offer, the sandbag, the poison pill, crown jewel warrants,
golden parachutes, the scorched earth defense and greenmail pay-
ments. A corporation may also adopt prophylactic antitakeover
measures, often consisting of amendments to the corporate charter.
These amendments are sometimes called "shark repellents" because
they are designed to ward off corporate predators prior to a hostile
acquisition of shares or a tender offer.
As hostile share acquisitions have increased and numerous cor-
porations have either responded to a takeover attempt or sought to
deter consideration of such an attempt, would-be suitors and other
shareholders have challenged these antitakeover measures. The anal-
yses of most courts look primarily to the initial decision to resist a
change in control. Quite expectedly, the courts have been loathe to
condemn wholesale all antitakeover activity. Moreover, corporate
management can normally justify its decision to resist any individual
overture. The result has been, with minimal exception, court ap-
proval of both the decision to resist and the means employed to effect
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that decision.1 Indeed, two recent decisions by the Delaware Supreme
Court, Moran v. Household International Inc. 2 and Unocal Corpora-
tion v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,3 highlight the near-complete abdication of
judicial review that results from this approach.
It is the position of this Article that the fixation of the courts on
the decision vel non to resist a hostile share acquisition provides only a
partial analysis. Rather, in considering the propriety of antitakeover
activity, an equally crucial focal point should be the means employed
by incumbent management to effect that decision. These measures
may impinge basic shareholder rights or alter the statutory distribu-
tion of power within the corporate structure, thereby requiring closer
scrutiny than they have generally received.
More fundamentally, this Article disagrees with the popular con-
sideration of "antitakeover activity" as a separate topic for legal anal-
ysis. Antitakeover activities are more appropriately considered as
part of the ongoing activities of the modem American corporate en-
terprise. From this perspective, traditional and fundamental princi-
ples of corporate governance (for example, the fiduciary duties of
corporate management and the allocation of powers within the corpo-
rate structure) may be applied to antitakeover activities, just as they
are applied to other corporate activity. Applying these fundamental
corporate principles can provide a framework of analysis to alert cor-
porate management to the legal risks inherent in antitakeover activity
and can also provide the courts with identifiable standards of review,
commensurate with the threat of that activity to traditional notions of
corporate democracy.
Part II of this Article discusses the market for corporate control
and management's response to these developments. Part III surveys
generally the cases and the commentary in this area, and concludes
that no current proposal or analysis adequately addresses the scope
and extreme effect of the means employed by management to deter
hostile suitors. In essence, the pace of management activity has out-
stripped the proposed tools of legal analysis. Thus, an alternative ba-
sis for reviewing all antitakeover measures is presented in part IV,
with emphasis on the substantive effect of such measures. This Arti-
cle proposes that such measures be viewed similarly to other corpo-
rate activity and likewise be judged by several fundamental principles
1. See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
2. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
3. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
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of corporate governance. The analysis developed in part IV is then
applied to several recent cases of notoriety, concluding that in many
circumstances the decisions have been ill-advised. Properly applied,
the method of analysis proposed here, coupled with traditional princi-
ples of corporate governance, is sufficient to correct abuses by corpo-
rate management in the takeover context.
II. ACTIVITY IN THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL
Since 1975, there have been more than fifty billion-dollar mergers
or acquisitions, with over one-half of these occurring since the begin-
ning of 1984.4 In 1984 alone, there were nearly 3,000 mergers or ac-
quisitions, the highest total in more than a decade. 5 The approximate
dollar value of these transactions rose from 61.9 billion dollars in
4. Sloan, Why is no one safe?, FORBES, Mar. 11, 1985, at 134-35. See also Top 25 Transactions,
appearing in quarterly issues of MERGERS & AcQUISIONS. The economic factors behind the dras-
tic increase in activity in the market for corporate control are many and complex but a few recent
contributions are particularly notable. First, the cash flow ramifications brought about by the 1981
Economic Recovery Tax Act have been important. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (1981) (codified
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). Under the Act, companies were allowed to accelerate deprecia-
tion of assets. Since depreciation is a noncash expense, corporate cash flow increased relative to
corporate earnings. To the extent that many of the financial markets overly emphasize earnings in
valuing stock, it is believed that the increased cash flow provided greater collateral for the credit
needed to carry out an acquisition-relative to the price of the corporate stock-than had previously
existed. In addition to the greater liquidity brought about through rapid depreciation, corporate
borrowing capacity was also supplemented by the drastic increase in earnings occurring as a result of
the economic expansion which began in 1982. This produced a significant change because of the low
levels of corporate borrowing and investment during the preceding recession.
Moreover, lending to those seeking to execute an acquisition is particularly attractive to banks
because of the high interest rates and fees that can be charged on the very large loans typically
involved. These enticing lending opportunities have come about at a time when bank profits are
under increasing pressure due to deregulation and nonbank competition. It has thus become increas-
ingly easy for acquisition loans to be obtained.
Another part of the financing of takeovers that is of recent origin is the issuance of low-grade
high-yield debt instruments, now fashionably referred to as "junk bonds." These securities may be
issued for the specific purpose of carrying out an acquisition. Sometimes they are issued by a corpo-
ration that will have no assets prior to acquisition of the target. Though there is considerable contro-
versy over the use of junk bonds to finance acquisitions, the net effect of this financing tool has
clearly been the production of an enormous source of funds for those attempting corporate acquisi-
tions. See Junk Bonds Don't Merit A Black-Hat Image, Wall St. J., Apr. 29, 1985, at 18, col. 3
(Midwest ed.).
A final factor, though of probably lesser importance, is the reduction in antitrust challenges to
business combinations under the Reagan Administration's Justice Department. The oil industry, in
particular, has undergone a significant increase in market concentration without challenge. Of par-
ticular note are: Standard Oil of California's combination with Gulf (a $13.2 billion transaction
joining the fourth and fifth largest companies in the industry), Texaco's acquisition of Getty Oil,
Mobil's acquisition of Superior Oil, and Royal Dutch/Shell's acquisition of Shell Oil.
5. 1984 Profile, MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, ALMANAC & INDEX 1985, at 25.
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1983 to 124 billion dollars in 1984, an increase of 139 percent.6 The
number of tender offers has also increased dramatically-1984's total
of 142 nearly doubled the 1983 total of 77.7 In number of tender
offers, the 1984 total approached the record levels set in the late
1970's, and in dollar amounts, the 1984 total of forty-two billion dol-
lars exceeded all but the 1981 dollar measure.8
The change in control among billion-dollar corporations has
alerted incumbent management in other large companies. 9 As a re-
sult, more than 200 of Standard & Poor's 500 largest corporations
now have some form of antitakeover provisions.10 For example,
golden parachute arrangements" are the most prevalent measure-
having been adopted by 180 companies. In addition, classified boards
of directors 12 were adopted by 154 companies, while 85 companies
included fair price provisions.1 3 Also, over 300 of Standard & Poor's
500 had authority to issue preferred stock, the characteristics of
which could be determined by the board of directors. The power to
determine the characteristics of this stock gives rise to the possible
creation of "poison pill preferred" stock.14
6. Id.
7. Tender Offer Update" 1985, 20 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS, Spring 1985, at 67.
8. Id.
9. This article addresses hostile share acquisitions as a set of transactions which may include
attempts by insurgents to gain control, to trigger a premium priced repurchase of their shares or
merely an investment by outside parties which is deemed threatening by management. The usual
result is that the target ends up selling itself to a more friendly purchaser which is referred to in the
jargon of the business as a "white knight." Historically, hostile tender offers for control had a better
than even chance for success, but since 1982 the percentage of failed hostile tender offers has in-
creased above 50%, and in 1984 reached 69.7%. Id. at 68.
10. In a survey conducted in October of 1984, the Investor Responsibility Research Center
found that of the 485 companies surveyed, 195 had antitakeover provisions in their charters. See
Institutional Investor Group Issues Directory of Firms' Shark Repellents, 17 SEc. REG. & L. REP.
(BNA) 335 (Feb. 22, 1985). See generally More Companies Than Ever Seeking Anti-Takeorer
Amendments, Study Says, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1960 (Nov. 8, 1985); Backlash Against
Greenmail, 20 MERGERS & ACQuisITIoNs, Spring 1985, at 21; Social Concerns in Spotlight, 20
MERGERS & ACQuIsITrONS, Summer 1985, at 18.
11. Golden parachute agreements provide benefits to corporate executives should a change in
corporate control occur. The benefits usually take the form of stock options or salary continuances
for a specified number of years. In many cases the potential benefits have a value of millions of
dollars. See infra note 45.
12. Classified boards allow a corporation to stagger the terms of its directors, thus making it
more difficult and time consuming for an insurgent to gain control of the board.
13. Fair price provisions generally require that all shareholders of a corporation subject to a
tender offer be paid the same price for their shares. These provisions seek to deter two-tiered tender
offers in which the offeror offers one price for enough shares to gain control, and then offers a lesser
price to the remaining shareholders once control has been obtained.
14. Poison pill preferred stock usually involves the creation of rights in the holder of the secur-
[Vol. 47:407
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Defenders of the defensive activities of target corporations argue
that the threat of hostile takeovers creates a diversion of resources
from long-term projects that might not show a profit for several years
to short-term projects that may increase temporarily the corporation's
earnings and stock price.15 Corporate management often claims that
it is only protecting the shareholders' long-term interests by increas-
ing directors' negotiating power vis-a-vis potential suitors.16
On the other side are promoters of increased activity in the mar-
ket for corporate control-shareholders eager to accept the premium
prices paid for their shares in tender offers, 17 corporations and inves-
tors seeking to acquire underutilized or complimentary assets or lines
ity to convert the poisoned preferred into, or to purchase at below market prices, the acquiring
corporation's common stock, thereby diluting the ownership interests of the acquisitor's former
shareholders. Current examples include warrants attached to common stock which give the holder
the right to buy two shares of the common stock of an unfriendly acquisitor for the price of one
share. The warrants become exercisable upon the accumulation of a specified percentage of stock by
the hostile insurgents.
Typically, shareholders are entitled:
(i) to redeem these shares for cash or debt securities if an outside entity acquires a
specified percentage of the corporation's stock, at, for example, a redemption price equal to
the highest price per share paid for the target's shares during a specified period, and/or
(ii) to convert the shares into common or convertible preferred stock of any control-
ling entity into which the target is merged, at, for example, half price.
The redemption privilege attached to the stock discourages the making of partial
tender offers by giving its holders the power to deplete the target company's assets substan-
tially; the conversion privilege discourages two-tiered tender offers by allowing sharehold-
ers to decline to tender their shares yet still receive the tender offer price in cash or its
equivalent if the tender offer succeeds.
Note, Protecting Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison-Pill" Pre-
ferred, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1964, 1967 (1984).
15. See, eg., Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101, 109-112
(1979).
16. Id. at 113-20. See also Saul, Hostile Takeovers What Should Be Done, 63 HARV. Bus.
REV., Sept.-Oct. 1985, at 18; Takeovers Rooted in Fear, Wall St. J., Sept. 27, 1985, at 22, col. 4
(Midwest ed.).
17. While much is uncertain in the corporate takeover arena, the empirical evidence that target
corporation shareholders enjoy immediate financial benefits from merger and acquisition attempts is
overwhelming. Asquith, Merger Bids, Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 51
(1983); Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345
(1980); Dodd, Merger Proposals, Management Discretion and Stockholder Wealth, 53 J. FIN. ECON.
1 (1980); Dodd & Ruback, Tender Offers and Stockholder Returns An EmpiricalAnalysis, 5 J. FIN.
ECON. 351 (1977); Jensen, Takeovers: folklore and science, 62 HARV. Bus. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1984, at
109; Jensen & Ruback, The Market for Corporate Controk The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON.
5 (1983); Kummer & Hoffmeister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J. FIN. 505
(1978); see also Pantry Pride Wins Its Battle For Revlon Inc., Wall St. J., Nov. 4, 1985, at 19, col. 3
("Nancy Hall, an analyst at Prudential-Bache Securities Inc., said Revlon shareholders 'won big at
$58 a share. The stock would never have gotten there on fundamentals.' "); Are the Corporate Raid-
ers Really White Knights?, Wall St. J., July 16, 1985, at 33, col. 3.
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of business and the Securities and Exchange Commission. SEC
Chairman John Shad has stated that most shareholders, without the
aid of a hostile suitor, will be unable to prevent board and manage-
ment entrenchment, given the corporate control of proxy machinery
and the substantial costs of a proxy fight. 18 Hostile share acquisitions
thus are seen as benefiting shareholders in one of two ways-either
increased prices if they sell their stock or improved management if
they hold on to it.
A number of members of Congress have rushed to initiate legisla-
tion on takeovers.1 9 Very little is likely to come of such congressional
18. See Economists Urge SEC To Resist Pleas for Curbs On Hostile Takeovers, 17 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 329 (Feb. 22, 1985). See also Rorer Group Retains Measure Against Takeovers, Wall
St. J., May 29, 1985, at 25, col. 3 ("Rorer Group, Inc. said its board voted unanimously to retain a
'poison pill' anti-takeover measure even though a majority of voted shares had been cast in favor of
rescinding the measure in an earlier proxy contest. The vote of shares wasn't binding.").
19. Several bills have recently been introduced in both the House and Senate, seeking, by vari-
ous means, to curb takeover activity. On November 22, 1985, Senator Howard Metzenbaum intro-
duced a bill (S. 1882) which would direct the SEC to promulgate regulations prohibiting poison pills.
Bill Seeks to Outlaw "Poison Pills" FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1154, Part One, at 5 (Dec. 4,
1985). Proposed legislation (H.R. 1003) introduced by Oklahoma's congressional delegation (no
doubt in response to constituents' fears surrounding the takeover attempts on Phillips Petroleum)
would eliminate the interest expense deduction on borrowings used to finance hostile takeovers. See
Proposal Would Stop Use of Tax Breaks to Finance Takeovers, 17 SEc. REG. & L. RE'. (BNA) 257
(Feb. 8, 1985). The bill would also restrict two-tier takeover attempts and place a 50% excise tax on
greenmail payments. Separately, Oklahoma Representative Mickey Edwards proposed a morato-
rium on hostile takeovers of domestic petroleum corporations and investigation of the wave of petro-
leum industry acquisitions by government regulatory authorities (H.R. 998). House Bill Would
Impose Moratorium On Oil Company Takeovers, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 258 (Feb. 8, 1985).
The proposed legislation would prohibit hostile tender offers during the moratorium-only offers
approved by a corporation's independent directors would be allowed to proceed.
A bill introduced by Senator John Chafee (R-R.I.) would also seek to achieve similar ends via
modification of the Tax Code. Chafee Introduces Tax Bill To Discourage Hostile Takeovers, 17 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (J3NA) 408 (Mar. 8, 1985). The bill proposes three changes to the tax laws: (1)
expenses associated with the production of greenmail income would no longer be deductible; (2) the
interest deduction would be denied on funds borrowed to carry out hostile acquisitions; and (3)
hostile acquisitions would be taxed generally under I.R.C. § 338 (West Supp. 1985) as asset rather
than stock purchases and the tax-free liquidation provisions of I.R.C. § 337 (West 1978 & Supp.
1985) would be made unavailable to the acquiring corporation.
Legislation proposed by New Jersey Democratic Representative Peter W. Rodino, Jr. (H.R.
1074) takes a different approach, advocating an increase in the waiting period for cash tender offers
to 30 days from its present 15. Rodino Bill Would Change Waiting Period For Mergers, Cash Tender
Offers, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 299 (Feb. 15, 1985). The bill would also give enforcement
agencies the power to increase the period beyond 30 days and eliminate the discretionary power the
Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission now have to waive the waiting period.
Another bill attacking hostile acquisitions (S. 706) was introduced recently by Senator William
Proxmire (D-Wis.). Proxmire Introduces Measure To Slow Down Hostile Takeovers, 17 SEc. REG. &
L. REP. (BNA) 476 (Mar. 22, 1985). The bill would generally require approval by a target corpora-
tion's independent directors before any hostile tender offeror could obtain more than 15% of the
[Vol. 47:407
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activity, however, because the Reagan Administration has established
that it harbors no animosity towards the recent outbreak of "takeover
fever." In The Annual Report of the Council of Economic Advisers
(Chapter 6), released February 2, 1985, the Council concluded that
the only abusive behavior in the current acquisition market was the
adoption of antitakeover measures.20 It urged no federal regulation of
either offensive or defensive tactics, however, preferring to allow the
courts to fashion individual remedies. The Council argued against
blanket prohibitions because of the difficulty in determining whether a
particular measure is abusive. The interdependence between a partic-
ular provision and the context within which it was adopted was be-
lieved to make determination on anything other than a case-by-case
basis impractical.
III. THE ABSENCE OF A COHERENT FRAMEWORK FOR
REVIEWING ANTITAKEOVER ACTIVITY BY TARGET
CORPORATIONS
The flurry of takeover activity in the past few years has put sub-
stantial pressure on all members of the legal community to develop a
framework for analyzing the defensive actions taken by target corpo-
rations. Left with incomplete guidance from commentators and the
SEC, the courts have approached the propriety of target antitakeover
activity from a limited perspective. Without any convincing frame-
work for separating traditional business decisions from those deci-
sions made in response to a hostile share acquisition, the courts
understandably have leaned heavily toward application of the busi-
ness judgment rule and minimal scrutiny of such activity.21
target's stock. Under the bill, a tender offer could not be made to shareholders until a majority of
the target's independent directors approved the offer. If rejected by independent directors, the pro-
posed offer would have to be approved by a two-thirds majority of shareholders before proceeding.
The legislation would, in effect, mandate supermajority provisions for all corporations.
20. Wifte House Economists Say No Need For Additional Takeover Regulations, 17 SEc. REG.
& L. REP. (BNA) 247 (Feb. 8, 1985). The Council found a net benefit resulting from takeovers and
stated that "the economic evidence suggests that existing regulations impose restraints that may
deter potentially beneficial transactions." Id. Arguing that takeovers substantially increase the
wealth of shareholders in target companies, but that delays force premiums paid above necessary
levels, the Council also criticized the Williams Act for detaining takeover attempts thus increasing
the cost of such attempts and enabling target companies to develop defenses which are often
effective.
21. See infra notes 101-26 and accompanying text.
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A. Scholarly Analysis of the Antitakeover Dilemma
The scholarly debate over the propriety of target antitakeover
activity has concentrated heavily on the relative merits of the tender
offer, both as a means of corporate control and as an element in en-
hancing economic wealth.22 The strength of this debate has been its
exploration of hostile share acquisitions from a public policy perspec-
tive, defined in terms of allocative efficiency. Its weakness is its failure
to move beyond this theoretical analysis and integrate its conclusions
with the daily operation of the firm and with the relationship between
management and shareholders within the modem public corporation.
1. Target Responses to Specific Hostile Share Acquisitions
The exchange between Frank Easterbrook and Daniel Fischel,
on the one side, and Martin Lipton, on the other, typifies the schol-
arly debate relating to actions taken by the target company in connec-
tion with an attempted hostile share acquisition. In 1979, Lipton took
a very firm pro-management position on the validity of a target
board's responses to an unsolicited takeover bid.23 Lipton focused on
the role of the board of directors in the traditional legal model of the
corporation and particularly on the role of the board in making policy
decisions which affect shareholders' welfare. Viewed in this manner,
Lipton argued that a takeover bid is just another major business deci-
sion. 24 Therefore, the business judgment rule should apply to a deci-
sion by the target board to reject a takeover bid, in the same manner
that it applies to any major business decision. Moreover, according to
Lipton, "[o]nce the directors have properly determined that a take-
over should be rejected they may take any reasonable action to ac-
complish this purpose. ' 25
Two years later Easterbrook and Fischel took the exact opposite
22. See generally Coffee, Regulating the Market For Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment
of the Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145 (1984) for a compre-
hensive review of the literature.
23. Lipton, supra note 15.
24. Id. at 109-18, 131. See also Herzel, Schmidt & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a
Right to Resist Tender Offers, 3 CORP. L. REv. 107 (1980) (emphasizes similarity of takeover bids to
other business decisions).
25. Lipton, supra note 15, at 123. Other commentators who reach the same basic conclusion
are Hochman & Folger, Deflecting Takeovers" Charter and By-Law Techniques, 34 Bus. LAW. 537
(1979); Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers" A Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM.
L. REv. 249 (1983); Nathan & Sobel, Corporate Stock Repurchases in the Context of Unsolicited
Takeover Bids, 35 Bus. LAW. 1545 (1980); Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover At-
tempt, 28 CASE W. REs. 882 (1978).
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position, based on an economic analysis of tender offers and target
defensive maneuvers. 26 Responding to a tender offer or other hostile
overture is, in their view, a prerogative of the shareholders and "does
not involve management of the corporation's affairs in any meaningful
sense and thus can be made by shareholders even though they are not
involved in those affairs to any significant degree."' 27 Thus, any re-
sponsive action by the target board only increases the offeror's cost
and decreases the number of offers.28 Because fewer potential pur-
chasers will be monitoring the efficiency of current management, the
price of the target's shares will decline, to the detriment of target
company shareholders. 29  Easterbrook and Fischel conclude that a
26. Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Management in Responding to a
Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981). Commentators adopting the same basic premises
include Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REv. 1028
(1982); Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case Against Defensive Tactics in Tender
Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819 (1981).
27. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 1198.
28. While most of the empirical evidence indicates that the preclusion of offers is harmful to
target shareholders, see supra note 17, there is evidence that some opposition by management may
benefit target shareholders in the form of greater premiums so long as the offer is not totally de-
feated. See Jensen & Ruback, supra note 17, at 38 ("Currently available evidence suggests that
managerial opposition to a takeover does not reduce shareholder wealth unless the resistance elimi-
nates potential takeover bids."); see also Lina & McConnell, An Empirical Investigation of the Im-
pact of 'Antitakeover' Amendments on Common Stock Prices, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 361 (1983) (finding
some evidence of positive returns to shareholders when antitakeover amendments are adopted).
29. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 1165-82. Easterbrook and Fischel's argument is
built on the presumption of the efficiency of securities markets, thereby mandating public trading.
Their focus is on agency costs as "an inevitable consequence of this relationship" where "the corpo-
ration is publicly held [and] the managers are unlikely to own a significant proportion of the firm's
securities." Id. at 1195. Accord Friedenberg, Jaws 11 The Impropriety Of Shark-Repellent Amend-
ments As A Takeover Defense, 7 DEL. J. CORP. L. 32 (1982):
This paper focuses on shifts in control in publicly held corporations whose shares are
widely traded. In essence, the argument made in this Part is that the stock market pro-
vides a good indication of the "worth" of a firm and that bidders who offer a premium
above that price must contemplate that a transfer of control will enhance that value. They
can achieve this transfer because shareholders as investors lack a strong attachment to
management. In closely held corporations the situation is different. Apart from the fact
that there is no organized market which will objectively value the firm, shareholders may
have a strong interest in management (indeed, some will be management). Thus, it is less
clear that shifts in control produce a net benefit, since the interests of shareholders who sell
may not outweigh the interests of shareholders who retain their stock and discover that the
quality of their investment has changed. Courts have been relatively liberal in allowing
share transfer restrictions (such as the right of first refusal) in order to preserve shareholder
expectations in closely held corporations. See generally Manne, Our Two Corporation Sys-
tems: Law and Economics, 53 VA. L. REv. 259, 278-80 (1967). Although that approach is
facially at odds with the free transferability argument presented in this article, it is not
inconsistent with the analysis upon which the argument is based.
Id. at 67 n.190.
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rule of "managerial passivity" should be imposed and that any at-
tempt by the target's managers to frustrate a tender offer should be
prohibited. 30
Several elements of this exchange are notable, particularly as
these positions typify both the level and the focus of the scholarly
approach to target board activity.31 First, both positions approach
the issue of defensive maneuvers as a monolith.3 2 Depending on the
protagonist, nearly all such measures are either proscribed or ap-
proved. One side emphasizes the accepted role of the board in mak-
ing corporate policy, even with respect to significant fundamental
corporate changes; while the other side focuses on the traditional
right of shareholders to dispose of their shares without interference by
the corporation or the board.
As a practical matter, however, such a dichotomy ignores the
symbiotic nature of corporate governance and the economic welfare
of shareholders in the modem corporation. In the public corporation,
the board of directors makes policy decisions on a regular basis which
fundamentally affect the desirability and value of the shares in the
corporation, thereby determining the ability of shareholders to dis-
pose favorably of these shares. These board actions, often involving
business opportunities which may or may not result in enhancement
of the corporation's value, traditionally have been reviewed in a
framework where there is a presumption of propriety. To attempt to
use the tender offer to redefine the relations within the corporation for
all purposes is unrealistic. Neither the courts nor any regulatory au-
thority will be willing to adopt the "managerial passivity" thesis
wholesale.
Moreover, even when accepting the validity of hostile tender of-
fers as a valuable means of changing or monitoring corporate control,
Easterbrook and Fischel's condemnation of defensive measures is tied
to the timing of their implementation. "[I]f actions that materially
hindered either the offer or the acquisition were taken immediately
after management first had reason to know of an impending offer,
30. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 1175-82. Gilson and Bebchuk differ from Easter-
brook and Fischel in that the former authors would limit management action to that which facili-
tates an auction for the target, whereas Easterbrook and Fischel would prohibit all defensive
measures.
31. For an excellent and comprehensive survey of the various economic positions on the an-
titakeover debate, see Coffee, supra note 22, at 1161-73.
32. See Lipton, supra note 15, at 105-06, 120-31. Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note
26, at 1199-1201. See generally Coffee, supra note 22, at 1148, 1152-54.
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then courts could presume that the actions were undertaken with a
view to defeating the offer."' 33 In contrast, "courts could simply pre-
sume, subject to rebuttal by a litigant who established the contrary,
that any plans set in motion before target managers had reason to
believe that there would be a takeover attempt were not taken with a
view to resisting the tender offer."'34 This focus on timing is strongly
shared by many who do not agree wholesale with the passivity
argument. 35
The timing distinction is not persuasive, however. The crux of
the argument in favor of managerial passivity is that any action that
raises the offeror's cost in attempting to commence or conclude a hos-
tile share acquisition decreases the number of such acquisitions and
therefore is harmful. Easterbrook and Fischel argue that a decrease
in hostile offers insulates the corporation and incumbent managers
from the impact of the market in monitoring these managers and min-
imizing agency costs. 36 The prohibitions embodied in the managerial
passivity rule are keyed, however, not only to these defensive actions,
but also to their timing.
Antitakeover actions, though, are not limited to responsive meas-
ures adopted in the face of a current tender offer or other takeover
effort. Fairly routine charter provisions, such as staggered board
terms, may also raise the offeror's cost, yet these provisions may have
been in place since the inception of the company. Since these provi-
sions likewise increase the costs faced by an acquiring company in the
takeover market, logically they should also be proscribed. Indeed,
33. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 1203.
34. Id. In a later article, arguing over the validity of management measures designed to facili-
tate an auction, Easterbrook and Fisohel still focus on the commencement of the tender offer process
as the crucial point in time. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers,
35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982). The approach taken in another article by them would prohibit all
defensive measures, even of a prophylactic nature. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Corporate Control
Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698 (1982). The problems with the approach proposed in that article are
discussed in Coffee, supra note 22, at 1216-21. For a view that all arguable antitakeover actions are
invalid, see Johnson, Anti-Takeover Actions and Defenses: Business Judgment or Breach of Duty?, 28
VILL. L. REV. 51 (1982-83).
35. See, eg., Coffee, supra note 22, at 1261-63; Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity In Tender Offer Defenses, 35 STAN. L. REv. 51, 51-52, 64-66 (1982); Oesterle, Target Man-
agers as Negotiating Agents For Target Shareholders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis,
71 CORNELL L. REv. 53, 83-84 (1985). See also the recommendations to the SEC of the Advisory
Committee on Tender Offers, discussed infra notes 73-89. For an argument that keys the validity of
some charter amendments to the timing of their effect, see Friedenberg, supra note 29.
36. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 1165-82. For a cogent argument challenging this
conclusion, see Oesterle, supra note 35, at 73-81.
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even relatively insignificant board actions (for example, creating em-
ployee stock options or declaring a dividend) could increase the costs
or decrease the desirability of a company as a potential target.
More fundamentally, the theoretical beauty of any rule of clear
prohibition is its presentation of a bright-line demarcation that is not
dependent on an inexact inquiry into managerial motives. Once it is
recognized, however, that the force of the managerial passivity thesis
is not limited to responsive measures of currently embattled manage-
ment, this beauty disappears. Indeed, if the thesis is persuasive, there
is nothing magical about post-tender offer maneuvers that would sub-
stantively separate them from pre-tender activities, except the appar-
ent desire to use timing as a surrogate for an inquiry into managerial
motivations.
Courts and corporate regulators will not cripple corporate
boards by imposing a rule of managerial passivity with respect to all
actions that increase the costs to a possible acquirer. Nor will courts
be willing to prohibit all post-tender activity based on a built-in pre-
sumption of jaundiced justifications. In the absence of this prohibi-
tion, the validity of individual board actions or charter amendments,
if challenged, must be tested by some other mode of analysis. It is
here that the managerial passivity thesis provides no guidance.37
37. Any focus on post-tender actions alone is flawed as a practical matter as well. Especially in
an era where hostile share acquisitions and corporate takeovers have become both routine and good
business, only the most myopic of managers would make even relatively routine business decisions
without consideration of the effect those decisions have on the company's desirability as a takeover
target. Any theory which uses the timing of the action as the trigger for application severely under-
estimates managerial intelligence and power. The prophylactic activity discussed in part I is a testa-
ment to such managerial ingenuity and ability.
Moreover, any analysis which focuses on responsive measures fails to take into account the
often drastic differences in ultimate effect of such measures when compared to today's panoply of
prophylactic maneuvers. Many actions taken in response to a tender offer may be episodic and of
little structural effect. Greenmail is a good example. It is a one-time premium payment to a large
shareholder, certainly causing a depletion in corporate assets. But its lasting effect is minimal. No
structural change in the corporation occurs and no reallocation of corporate decision-making power
results.
The current penchant for charter amendments as a deterrent to takeover consideration provides
a sharp contrast. Initially, unlike many defensive maneuvers which deter only the individual hostile
suitor currently seeking control, such amendments, if effective, deter all potential suitors. Moreover,
some of these provisions, such as supermajority requirements where the vote necessary to approve
any significant shift in corporate control allows a present majority to prevent a future majority from
taking effective action, result in a shift in control among shareholders. Where the supermajority is
set so high that action cannot be taken without the vote of shares held or controlled by incumbent
management, all control over fundamental changes effectively shifts from the shareholders to incum-
bent management.
A focus on the timing of action taken thus tends to ignore the variations in the effect of that
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While an economic analysis provides insight into the effect of an-
titakeover maneuvers, it is necessarily inconclusive. In a recent com-
prehensive article on the economics of the market for corporate
control, John Coffee surveyed the debate over the economics of the
tender offer and concluded that "if one asks 'who wins and who loses
from takeovers,' these different explanations give every possible an-
swer.' ' 38 Even if it is accepted that hostile share acquisitions and ac-
companying auction markets have a positive effect on allocative
efficiency, it does not necessarily follow that defensive actions or pro-
phylactic measures should be invalidated.3 9 Such a conclusion, even
from an economic perspective, does not indicate whether incremental
gains from preventing such tactics exceed incremental costs. 4°
The above analysis is not meant to imply, however, that Lipton is
right in his analysis. On the contrary, he also errs by being overly
simplistic to the extent that he judges all defensive or prophylactic
measures, particularly board activities, as presumptively valid under
the business judgment rule. Lipton contends that:
Once the directors have properly determined that a takeover should be
rejected they may take any reasonable action to accomplish this purpose,
including litigation, complaints to governmental authorities, the acquisi-
tion of a company to create an antitrust or regulatory problem for the
raider, the issuance of shares to a big brother, or the premium purchase
of shares of the target from the raider.41
Indeed, Lipton does not even limit this carte blanche to episodic re-
sponses to a particular, arguably unfair, tender offer. Rather, in his
view, a "company may attempt to discourage takeovers through such
tactics as shark-repellent charter amendments and lobbies for take-
action. To be adopted by the courts or the regulatory authorities, a theory of review of antitakeover
actions must consider the effects of those actions on the corporate structure in light of accepted
principles of corporate governance. Any strict rule of prohibition founded simply on the perceived
economic benefit or detriment of potential changes in corporate control ignores such effects and their
variations.
38. Coffee, supra note 22, at 1173. But see supra note 17, which relates to the financial benefits
to target corporation shareholders.
39. See DeAngelo & Rice, Antitakeover Charter Amendments and Stockholder Wealth, 11 J.
FIN. ECON. 329 (1983) (finding slight negative returns to shareholders when antitakeover amend-
ments are adopted); Linn & McConnell, supra note 28, at 361 (finding some evidence of positive
returns to shareholders when antitakeover amendments are adopted). See also supra note 28, which
indicates that some opposition of takeover offers may be beneficial to target shareholders.
40. Coffee, supra note 22, at 1198-99. Coffee ably catalogues the diseconomies of the tender
offer. Id. at 1221-50.
41. Lipton, supra note 15, at 123-24 (citations omitted).
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over laws that have the same effect." 42
The near-abdication of judicial review implicit in applying the
business judgment rule ignores the corporate governance and power
allocation effects of such action by presuming its validity. A focus on
the traditional power of the board to oversee management of the cor-
poration subsumes the second level issue of whether the means em-
ployed by the board infringe on the allocation of decision-making
power within the corporation, so as to violate accepted norms of cor-
porate governance. For example, while the board may normally act
to declare the rights and preferences for stock, and to declare divi-
dends on that stock, when a redeemable poison pill stock is created
(thus making any substantial share acquisition prohibitively expen-
sive) this effectively forces the potential suitor to negotiate with the
target board over the redemption of the poison pill. The result is the
reallocation of control, from the shareholders to the board, over all
proposed large share acquisitions.
In sum, as typified by the Easterbrook and Fischel versus Lipton
debate, the scholarly positions on the validity of responsive measures
by a target board provide little guidance for deciding particular cases.
Because the circumstances and nature of hostile share acquisitions
vary greatly, courts would be unlikely to totally handcuff incumbent
management.43 Conversely, it is not justifiable to grant unbridled dis-
cretion to the board, since the means employed may tend to cripple
the corporation more than the perceived effect of a hostile takeover. 44
2. Adoption of Prophylactic Measures
Compared with the commentary on responsive measures to a
current or impending takeover threat, less has been written about cor-
porate actions which may deter possible suitors from ever attempting
to take over another corporation. Scholarly commentary often gives
little play to the plethora of prophylactic actions implemented by the
board of directors, either pursuant to statutory authority or a broad
enabling provision in the corporate charter.45 Instead, the existing
42. Id. at 113.
43. See, eg., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
44. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092
(1981) (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
45. The notable exception has been commentary on "golden parachutes." See, eg., Riger, On
Golden Parachutes, Ripcords or Ripoffs? Some Comments on Special Termination Agreements, 3
PACE L. REv. 15 (1982); Note, Corporate Golden Parachutes: An Executive Bailout From Fiduciary
Duty?, 9 NOVA L.J. 447 (1985); Note, Golden Parachute Agreements: Cushioning Executive Bailouts
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articles focus primarily on the shareholder's adoption of charter pro-
visions which either (1) make an acquisition more expensive, (2) inter-
pose requirements that cause a delay, or (3) create veto provisions in
favor of some group within the corporate structure.46
a. Preventive Actions by the Board
Board decisions, in the ordinary course of business, have always
had the cloak of presumptive validity provided by the business judg-
ment rule. Where these decisions appear to be made in good faith,
after due deliberation, the board's members are not liable for breach-
ing their fiduciary duty to the shareholders, even if the decision later
turns out to be detrimental to the corporation.47 Only where the di-
rectors can be found to have been grossly negligent will liability
attach.4 8
The popularity of board-approved highly lucrative severance
agreements with top management, commonly referred to as "golden
parachutes," highlights the difficulty faced by the commentators in
analyzing pre-tender offer antitakeover activities. Most commenta-
tors have been critical of these agreements but have not provided a
persuasive basis for invalidation.49 The most common argument
against such provisions is that they waste corporate assets. However,
claims of corporate waste are extremely difficult to prove, especially in
the compensation context, since part of the board's traditional func-
tion is to determine appropriate levels of executive compensation.
Thus, like other decisions which involve primarily a monetary expen-
diture or financial commitment, the protection afforded by the busi-
ness judgment rule is difficult to avoid.
The current popularity of "blank check" preferred stock or stock
in the Wake of a Tender Offer, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 516 (1983); Note, Future Executive Bailouts:
Will Golden Parachutes Fill the American Business Skies?, 14 TEx. TECH L. REV. 615 (1983); Note,
Golden Parachutes Executive Employment Contracts, 40 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1117 (1983).
46. See, eg., Black & Smith, Antitakeover Charter Provisions: Defending Self-Help for Take-
over Targets, 36 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 699 (1979); Carney, Shareholder Coordination Costs, Shark
Repellents, and Takeout Mergers: The Case Against Fiduciary Duties, 1983 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 341; Gilson, The Case Against Shark Repellent Amendments: Structural Limitations On
The Enabling Concept, 34 STAN. L. REv. 775 (1982).
47. See, ag., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
See generally Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFsTRA L. REv. 93 (1979); Man-
ning, The Business Judgment Rule in Overview, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 615 (1984).
48. See, ag., Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d
805 (Del. 1984).
49. See, eg., authorities cited at supra note 45.
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warrants, which allows the board to issue such stock at its discretion
and to endow the stock with any designations, preferences and rights
selected by the board, raises the same problems.50 The authority of
the board to make this issuance is sanctioned by statute.5' The focus
thus turns to the board's exercise of this power. Like other board
decisions affecting the general operation of the corporation and its
capital base, commentators have concluded that the use of such au-
thority to deter a hostile suitor is well within traditional board
discretion.5 2
b. Charter Amendments
Particularly perplexing for the commentators has been the
proper way to analyze amendments to the articles of incorporation
which chill takeover efforts. At least two problems arise in this con-
text. First, what standard should be applied to board implementation
or recommendation of such changes, and second, what effect should
shareholder approval have on the validity of these organizational
alterations?
With respect to board-proposed charter amendments, the com-
mentators once again are split.5 3 Easterbrook and Fischel, for exam-
ple, while not specifically addressing pre-tender offer tactics, do
incidentally opine that the "business judgment rule should not apply,
however, to unambiguous preventive defensive tactics such as shark
repellent charter and bylaw amendments. This type of resistance...
should be prohibited per se."'54
The problem with such a conclusion is that it would prohibit the
board from making decisions (for example, recommending a change
in the articles or bylaws) that are normally part of the board's proper
functions.5 5 It is not enough to respond that only "shark repellent"
provisions, but not other charter amendments, should be prohibited,
because such a distinction raises a problem of identification. For ex-
50. See supra note 14.
51. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (1983).
52. See, ag., Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier and Partial Tender Offers:
The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions Under Delaware Law, 11 SEc.
REG. L.J. 291 (1984); Note, supra note 14.
53. Compare Black & Smith, supra note 46 and Carney, supra note 46, with Bebchuck, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1693, 1744-47
(1985) and Friedenberg, supra note 29.
54. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 26, at 1203 n.2. See also supra note 18.
55. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 46; Friedenberg, supra note 29. See also Coffee, supra note 22,
at 1192 ("highly restrictive limits should be placed" on shark repellents).
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ample, a charter amendment which creates staggered terms for the
board of directors may have some deterrent effect. Does a board
breach its fiduciary duty by proposing such an amendment?
Without adopting a strict rule which would hold that a board
breached its fiduciary duty by proposing changes which have any de-
terrent effect, standards must be developed for distinguishing valid
from invalid changes. Here, however, as in analyzing unilateral board
action, the guidelines for the inquiry pose the problem. Any attempt
to ferret out and weigh motivations in the context of business deci-
sions must fail, since persuasive parsing of complex judgmental deci-
sions is rarely possible.56
Commentators urging the total invalidation of these charter
amendments also must contend with shareholder sanction. Unlike
unilateral board action, these charter changes often require and re-
ceive majority shareholder approval. Assuming full disclosure of the
relevant provision, its effects and the purposes for its recommenda-
tion, such approval by the shareholders would appear conclusive. It
thus seems that the board not only is insulated by this shareholder
action, but also that shareholder approval prevents an attack on the
substance of the provision.
Authors respond to the issue of shareholder approval either by
ignoring this impediment to their theory,57 by deprecating (but not
56. One author attempts to obviate a direct inquiry into motive by looking at the purpose of
the amendment. See Friedenberg, supra note 29. "Purpose," however, is defined not in terms of
justification, but in relation to the circumstances in which the charter provisions would operate. "A
per se prohibition is clearly appropriate when the amendments serve no function outside the tender
offer context." Id. at 92.
Such a theory takes the managerial passivity thesis one step further. Not only does a target's
board have no legitimate function in the face of a tender offer other than the provision of information
to the shareholders, but the recommendation by the corporate board of any charter provision which
operates solely in the tender offer context is a breach of fiduciary duty. According to this approach,
efficient operation of the market for corporate control requires invalidation of any such recommen-
dation, no matter what the justification.
A focus on "purpose", so defined, would thus result in invalidation of charter provisions, such
as supermajority voting requirements and fair price provisions. Such a rule poses great difficulties.
For example, invalidation of charter provisions requiring supermajority voting approval for mergers
or other business combinations ignores the fact that many states impose such a requirement by
statute. Beyond the facial incongruity of prohibiting such amendments in states where the;-- is no
statutory provision but accepting its mandatory application in jurisdictions which impose the re-
quirement by statute, such provisions have well-recognized positive purposes in protecting minority
shareholders. A rule imposing a complete ban on such provisions appears too extreme, if not funda-
mentally misguided.
57. See, eg., Johnson, supra note 34, at 71-74.
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denying) the efficacy of such approval58 or by boldly arguing that "the
significance of tender offers is too important to be bargained away by
shareholders. '59 Except for the possibility of federal or state legisla-
tion which would prohibit the adoption of certain provisions, these
theories fail to provide a sufficiently specific rationale for wholesale
invalidation of these acts of shareholder democracy. It is ironic that
the genesis of the theories that would invalidate all antitakeover activ-
ity stems from a concern for shareholder rights and welfare, yet, as
applied, such theories must urge rejection of otherwise statutorily ap-
proved acts of shareholder democracy. The courts, attempting to ap-
ply traditional concepts of corporate governance, require finer tools of
legal analysis.
B. The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission
Despite the level of takeover activity over the past decade, and
the numerous bills designed to address particular aspects of the issue
which have been introduced in Congress in the past few years, 60 the
Securities and Exchange Commission stands as something of a lone
ranger with a single six-shooter against the onslaught of varied and
imaginative defensive weapons developed by potential target corpora-
tions. Its primary statutory tool, the Williams Act,61 was enacted
eighteen years ago, primarily to regulate the tender offeror.62 Conse-
58. See, eg., Gilson, supra note 46, at 822-27.
59. Friedenberg, supra note 29, at 76-77.
60. See supra note 19.
61. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(d) to (e), 78n(d) (1982 & Supp. 11 1984).
62. By investing in a business, investors implicitly signal their approval of current manage-
ment. Unless the market price of the stock plummets dramatically due to perceived mismanage-
ment, most shareholders, representing a variety of diverse investment goals, will not be interested in
changing the status quo. Other investors, or even outsiders, may believe that the currency market
price of the stock, while acceptable to some, is far below the market price that could be achieved
either by liquidating assets or altering strategy. To these investors the question is not whether man-
agement is achieving an acceptable market price per share of stock but whether management is
maximizing the market price per share.
Such investors could attempt to effect change through a proxy battle or a merger, but these
options give wide discretion to current management. Beginning in the early 1960s, these investors
focused on the tender offer as the best alternative means to bring about corporate change. The
tender offer was seen as less expensive, as not requiring approval by management or a vote of the
shareholders, and, because shareholders tendered their shares voluntarily, as running less risk that
the fairness of the tender offer price would be challenged.
Most important, the tender offer remained secret until it was implemented. The offeror did not
have to disclose the offer to management prior to making the offer and did not even have to disclose
its identity once the offer became public. Nor did the offeror have to disclose any plans for the target
company if control was acquired. Thus, even without a front-end loaded two-tiered tender offer,
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quently, the SEC has been hampered in its attempt to regulate the
defensive activities of a target corporation.
L The Limitations of SEC Authority Under Tender
Offer Legislation
After much consideration of the value of tender offers to the
economy, 63 Congress passed the Williams Act in 1968 and designated
there was reason for shareholder concern for the corporation's long-term viability, adding impetus to
the reasons to tender. Not surprisingly, tender offers became very popular and successful.
63. At first, the problems posed by cash tender offers were presented in Congress couched in
inflammatory terms:
In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced to corporate shells after white-
collar pirates have seized control with funds from sources which are unknown in many
cases, then sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the loot among
themselves.
A group of corporate raiders, collusively joined together, can buy up enough shares of
a corporation's stock virtually to guarantee victory in a proxy fight without management or
shareholders having any knowledge of these acquisitions. The purchases can be made in
so-called street names or, even more furtively, by Swiss banks for an undisclosed account
number.
111 CONG. REc. 28,257-58 (1965) (Statement of Sen. Williams). Senator Kuchel, embellishing these
remarks of Senator Williams, spoke of "financially raped" corporations. Full Disclosure Of Corpo-
rate Equity Ownership And In Corporate Takeover Bids: Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on
Securities of the Senate Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 46 (1967) (statement
of Sen. Kuchel) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on S. 510]. Later, free from impassioned and inflam-
matory remarks, the debate began to center upon the merits of tender offers. The tenor of the debate
changed dramatically as exemplified by the following exchange between Senator Williams and Mr.
Painter:
Sen. Williams: "Raider" is a bad word. We don't use that word in this bill. This is a
corporate takeover bill ....
Mr. Painter: There must be some policy reason why you are seeking regulation here. And
since the word "raiders," or "pirate," or whatever you wish to call it, had been used previ-
ously in these hearings-and I think even had been used on the floor of the Senate in
introducing the Bill.
Sen. Williams: Walt a minute. Say that again?
Mr. Painter: We can have that stricken from the record if it is inaccurate.
Sen. Williams: I just didn't hear you.
Mr. Painter: I seemed, in reading your remarks, Senator, to catch some flavor of the type
of language that I have been using in your remarks on the floor when you introduced the
bill.
Sen. Williams: You are absolutely right. But that was during the 89th Congress and I
have changed my language.
Id at 123. The first issue was whether tender offers served a legitimate purpose. Proponents argued
that tender offers helped to rid the American economy of its worst enemy-inefficient management.
Id. at 62 (testimony of Prof. Samuel Hayes III) (study finds that target companies were sluggish,
unprofitable, and excessively liquid). With the increasing size of corporations, ownership was be-
coming less concentrated. Widely scattered shareholders could not mount a serious challenge to
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the SEC as the regulatory agency responsible for promulgating and
implementing regulations. 64 The legislative history of the Act reflects
the concern of the bill's author that the SEC should remain neutral in
the tender offer forum.65 The purported purpose of the bill was to
protect investors by requiring the offeror to make "full and fair disclo-
sure" 66 because it was only with such disclosure that investors could
make an informed investment decision.67
management, which had become firmly entrenched. Id at 129 (statement of Prof. Arthur Fleischer,
Jr.). Professor Kaplan thought it was vital to "good" management to do a good job. Id. at 120
(testimony of Prof. Stanley A. Kaplan).
On the other side, Congress was concerned with offerors who liquidated a target company after
a successful tender offer. The supporters of tender offers conceded that corporate raiders were a
problem. Id. at 120 (testimony of Prof. Stanley A. Kaplan). In the end, however, Congress decided
that while corporate raiders may be a problem, the problem posed by entrenched management was
much greater. For the good of the economy, tender offers would not be abolished.
64. After deciding that most tender offers were beneficial, Congress next addressed the issue of
whether to regulate tender offers, Le., whether any side in the dispute should be accorded more or
less protection. Even without regulation, management was not powerless. Management could use
corporate assets and shareholders. Management could count on the support of those who symbioti-
cally were linked to management: bankers, suppliers, customers, and institutional investors.
Management could drive up the market price of the corporation's stock by repurchasing the
stock or by increasing the dividend. Once the gap between the market price and tender offer price
narrows, the incentive for arbitragers to enter the market decreases. Moreover, the incentive for
shareholders to tender their shares also decreases. Of course, the offeror could raise the tender offer
price, thereby providing an incentive for both arbitragers and shareholders, but the offeror may not
be able to raise the price because of a lack of financing or because a higher price would render the
tender offer unprofitable.
Management could also amend the corporate charter, highly publicize the offer hoping to scare
customers, suppliers, and employees of the offeror, issue new shares, execute long term employment
contracts with the corporation, change the situs of the corporation to take advantage of a more
restrictive state takeover statute, merge the corporation with another corporation or bring an action
for injunctive relief.
65. S. REP. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967) ("The Committee has taken extreme care
to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in favor of the person
making the takeover bid."); 113 CONG. Rnc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams); Hearings on
S. 510, supra note 63, at 16 (statement of Manuel Cohen, Chairman Securities & Exchange
Commission).
66. 113 CONG. REc. 854-55 (1967) (remarks of Sen. Williams).
67. The shareholders of the target company were perceived to be at an extreme disadvantage
due to the secrecy and speed of the typical tender offer. While state corporation laws generally
required both disclosure and a vote of approval by shareholders for other methods of changing
corporate control, shareholders presented with a tender offer often did not have the information they
needed to make an informed decision. Compounding this problem, shareholders regularly were re-
quired to tender within just a few days of the announcement of the offer, shares were accepted on a
first-tendered basis, and the shares could not be withdrawn until the offer was completed or aban-
doned.
The Williams Act attempted to mitigate the information problem by requiring that a person
who would beneficially own more than five percent of a class of securities after completing a tender
offer must file a Schedule 14D-1 with the SEC on the date of commencement of the offer and must
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While the SEC is given general regulatory authority under the
Williams Act,68 its authority to deal with target company antitake-
over activity is constrained by both the terms and the focus of the
Act, as well as by related legislation. By its language, the Williams
Act only governs tender offers. While third-party tenders are the pri-
mary method of obtaining corporate control, tender offers by corpora-
tions for their own shares are a possible, but relatively infrequent,
takeover defense. 69
The unevenness in regulation under the Act also appears from its
focus on protecting the target shareholders. The purpose of the Act
was to regulate the activities of bidding and target companies only to
the extent necessary to insure an informed and unhurried decision by
these shareholders. There is no attempt to regulate the internal affairs
of either corporation. The tender offer itself is thus the public act
being regulated, while the maneuvering by target management is of
little apparent concern. The result is that, in a tender offer, the ac-
tions of the bidder are circumscribed by federal law while the activi-
ties of the target are mostly left to state regulation.70
Although the SEC, under the guise of protecting target share-
holders generally, might be able to adopt a specific regulation dealing
also deliver a copy of this schedule to the target company. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d) (1982). Schedule
14D-1 requires disclosure of: (1) the identity of the target company and the equity security being
sought; (2) the identity and background of the offeror;, (3) the nature and amount of any past con-
tracts, negotiations or transactions with the target company; (4) the source and amount of funds that
will be used to purchase tendered shares; (5) the purpose of the tender offer and plans materially
altering the target; (6) the extent of the offeror's beneficial ownership of the stock of the target; (7)
the material terms of contracts, arrangements, understandings, or relationships which would give
another person the power to vote or dispose of the target company's stock; (8) the identity of the
person retained by or for the bidder to solicit or recommend the offer to the shareholders and the
terms of their employment or compensation; (9) the financial statements of the offeror; (10) any
information that a shareholder would consider as material in deciding whether to tender shares; and
(11) copies of certain documents, including solicitation letters.
The Williams Act also dealt with substantive concerns. All shareholders may withdraw ten-
dered shares within fifteen days of the day the offer was first published or, if the tendered shares have
not been accepted, after 60 days from the date of the original tender offer. If the tender offer is for
less than all of the outstanding shares of a class of stock, and more shares were tendered than
requested, the offeror must accept the shares on a pro rata basis. If the offeror raises the price offered
for tendered shares before the offer expires, all accepted shares must be paid the increased price
regardless of when tendered or accepted.
68. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78n(d)(1), (d)(4), (d)(5), (d)(8), (e) (1982).
69. But see Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
70. Bidders also have moved to avoid the restraints of the Williams Act by making share
acquisitions by private or open market purchase instead of by tender offer. See, e.g., Hanson Trust
PLC v. SCM Corp., 774 F.2d 47 (2d Cir. 1985).
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with a particular abuse by the target corporation, 71 such a method
suffers by being reactive. Today the SEC might prohibit discrimina-
tory self-tenders, 72 but tomorrow incumbent management will devise
a new method to forestall a takeover attempt. What is needed, there-
fore, is a theory of substantive regulation of defensive devices which
provides a framework for analysis and prescription.
In partial recognition of the limitations of its authority under
current federal law, the SEC, in 1983, established an Advisory Com-
mittee on Tender Offers. The Committee was to review the effective-
ness of current laws and recommend legislative and regulatory
changes which would govern the actions of both target and bidding
corporations. 73 The Committee was composed of eighteen prominent
acquisition experts, 74 and its final report contained fifty recom-
mendations.75
Eleven of the Committee's fifty recommendations concerned
"Regulation of Opposition to Acquisitions of Control," 76 and they
contained several interesting elements. First, the Committee em-
braced the view that "the business judgment rule should be the princi-
pal governor of decisions made by corporate management including
decisions that alter the likelihood of a takeover. ' 77 This reaffirms the
dichotomy of federal regulation for the bidder and state regulation for
71. For example, SEC Rule 14e-2, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-2 (1985), requires target management
to tell shareholders of its position on the tender and to disclose the reasons for that decision.
72. See SEC Staff Seeks Rule to Spell Out Ban Against Exclusionary Tender Offers, Wall St. J.,
June 24, 1985, at 2, col. 3.
73. See SEC Release No. 34-19528, 48 Fed. Reg. 9111 (1983).
74. The members were Dean LeBaron, President of Batterymarch Financial Management,
who was selected as Chair of the Committee; Jeffrey B. Bartell, Esq., of Quarles & Brady; Michael
D. Dingman, President of the Signal Companies, Inc.; Frank H. Easterbrook, of the University of
Chicago Law School; Joseph H. Flom, Esq., of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; the Honora-
ble Arthur J. Goldberg; Robert F. Greenhill, Managing Director of Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.;
Ray J. Groves, Chair and Chief Executive of Ernst & Whinney; Alan R. Gruber, Chair and Chief
Executive Officer of Orion Capital Corporation; Edward L. Hennessey, Jr., Chair of the Board of
Allied Corporation; Gregg A. Jarrell, Senior Economist of Lexecon, Inc.; Robert P. Jensen, Chair
and Chief Executive Officer of E.F. Hutton LBO, Inc.; Martin Lipton, Esq., of Wachtell, Lipton,
Rosen & Katz; Robert E. Rubin, of Goldman, Sachs & Co.; Irwin Schneiderman of Cahill, Gordon
& Reindel; John W. Spurdle, Jr., Senior Vice President of Morgan Guaranty Trust Company of New
York; Jeff C. Tarr, Managing Partner of Junction Partners; and Bruce Wasserstein, Managing Di-
rector of the First Boston Corporation. SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON TENDER OFFERS, REPORT
OF RECOMMENDATIONS (July 8, 1983), reprinted in FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) No. 1028 (extra ed.)
(July 15, 1983) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT].
75. Id.
76. Id., Recommendations 33-43.
77. Id., Recommendation 33, at 34.
[Vol. 47:407
HOSTILE SHARE ACQUISITIONS
the target. Second, the Committee, with some dissent,78 generally
agreed that antitakeover measures were "inappropriate when adopted
after the announcement of a takeover," 79 once again putting a pre-
mium on prophylactic measures.80 Third, the Committee focused on
supermajority vote requirements for change of control transactions.8 1
In the Committee's view, a supermajority provision could only be
adopted if the vote for adoption at least matched the vote required
under the provisions of the supermajority provision itself.82 In es-
sence, a current majority could not adopt a supermajority provision
that does not have the support of a current supermajority. 83
The Advisory Committee's Report, as it relates to target an-
titakeover activity, suffers from several fundamental flaws. Most im-
portant, there is no guiding principle or principles identified by the
Committee in reaching its conclusions. 84 Further, no attempt is made
to address the critical question of the role of the target board of direc-
tors and its interrelation with both the role of the shareholders in cor-
porate governance and the related right of shareholders, as
individuals, to dispose of their stock.85 Finally, the Committee's re-
78. Some members thought that some antitakeover measures were justified by the coercive
nature of partial or two-tier tender offers. Id at 37.
79. Id
80. Specifically, the Committee suggested that change of control compensation (e.g. golden
parachutes) be prohibited after a tender offer commences but not before. Id., Recommendation 28,
at 40-41. It is not clear from the report whether other post-tender actions should be analyzed under
the business judgment rule, a stricter standard, prima facie prohibited, or some other method of
review employed by the courts. The Committee would put prophylactic charge of control compen-
sation to an advisory (non-binding) shareholder vote. Similarly, to provide a check when incumbent
management negotiates special agreements aimed at courting a friendly bidder (white knight), the
Committee suggested that any issuance of more than 15% of a target company's stock during a
tender offer must be approved by the shareholders. Id., Recommendation 41, at 44.
81. Id, Recommendation 35, at 36.
82. Id. See also MICH. COMP. LAWs ANN. § 450.1455 (West 1973).
83. See also Gilson, supra note 46.
84. The Committee suggested that certain matters be designated "advisory vote matters" re-
quiring review at annual shareholder meetings. Matters covered include supermajority provisions,
disenfranchisement, standstill agreements, and change of control compensation. These matters
would be separately designated in the proxy statement in a "Change of Control" section but the
shareholder vote would be non-binding on the board and would not affect existing agreements.
Thus, we have the minimal review of the business judgment rule for some actions, others are totally
prohibited, and a third group are subject to an apparently futile exercise of pretend corporate democ-
racy by way of a shareholder straw vote. Why certain actions or provisions fall into one category as
opposed to another may be guessed at, but nothing is clear beyond the conclusions presented.
85. When do the actions of the board involve sufficient aspects of self-dealing to require a
stricter standard of review? When do these actions sufficiently impose on shareholder rights or
discriminate among shareholders so as to be invalid as a violation of statutory and common law
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port provides no prescriptive framework for analysis.8 6
The weakness of this point-in-time focus and lack of overriding
principles is highlighted by two antitakeover measures, not unheard
of at the time of the Committee report, but which have become more
significant since the Committee made its recommendations. First, the
board of directors may issue "poison pill preferred" stock to ward off
potential raiders. The Committee report does not address such use of
share preferences specifically, nor does it provide a prescriptive frame-
work for analyzing the validity of this device or the board's use of it.
Rather, the Committee reaffirms its general allegiance to the business
judgment rule.87
Second, consider the adoption by the shareholders of a fair-price
amendment designed to insure equality of treatment in response to a
two-tier tender offer. The Committee does not address such a provi-
sion directly and only gives vague guidance as to its position on the
validity of such an amendment. "Congress and the Commission
should adopt appropriate legislation and/or regulations to prohibit
the use of charter or by-law provisions that erect high barriers to
change of control."88 Whether the fair-price provision fits within this
suggested prohibition is left to speculation. In any event, significant
Congressional action in the foreseeable future in support of these pro-
posals is unlikely.89
2. SEC Antifraud Regulation
The federal securities laws provide the SEC with another alterna-
tive whereby they can use existing statutory provisions to regulate an-
titakeover activity. Initially, federal law was thought to apply to a
target board's actions in response to a tender offer, either under the
share-transactions fraud prohibition of Section 10(b) 90 and Rule lOb-
591 or pursuant to Section 14(e) of the Williams Act.92 Thus, it was
norms of corporate governance and discretion? The reader of the Report is left with ample recom-
mendations, but precious little analysis.
86. That is, it appears that the Committee simply chose some favorite antitakeover measures
and voted up or down on them. Maybe the Committee viewed its role as merely surveying the then
current variety of defensive measures and pronouncing judgment on them. But we are left with no
means by which to assess the validity of future mechanisms designed to thwart takeover activity.
87. ADVISORY COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 75, Recommendation 33, at 34.
88. Id., Recommendation 35, at 35.
89. See Commission Will Not Reintroduce Takeover Legislative Package, Shad Says, 17 SEC.
REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 573, 573-76 (Apr. 5, 1985). See also supra note 19.
90. 15 U.S.C. § 78j (1982).
91. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1985).
[Vol. 47:407
HOSTILE SHARE ACQUISITIONS
thought that the federal and/or state securities laws could be used to
regulate target board activity which seemed unfair or manipulative,
even if the conduct did not amount to outright misrepresentation or
deception. 93
This theory was dashed by the Supreme Court in Schreiber v.
Burlington Northern, Inc.94 The issue presented to the Court in
Schreiber was whether the actions of El Paso's board (the target com-
pany), which caused the rescission of an initial tender offer by Bur-
lington in favor of the less-favorable friendly proposal, violated the
antifraud provisions of the Williams Act. This action, the plaintiff
alleged, was manipulative within the meaning of the statutory prohi-
bition of "fraudulent, deceptive or manipulative acts or practices." 95
The Supreme Court, however, rejected this claim. According to
the Court, "manipulative acts" require some element of misrepresen-
tation or nondisclosure. 96 Without misrepresentation or nondisclo-
sure, there is no violation of the antifraud provisions of the Williams
Act. It thus appears clear that the typical array of antitakeover activ-
ity by target corporations, if accompanied by adequate disclosure, will
not give rise to a federal antifraud cause of action.
3. SEC Regulation of Proxy Solicitations
Although the SEC has been limited in its ability to substantively
regulate the defensive tactics of target companies, it does have the
authority to regulate the solicitation of proxies from shareholders by
either the target or an outsider. The SEC rules on solicitation have
92. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
93. See, eg., Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1163
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976). Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977),
provided the first limitation on the application of federal antifraud provisions to target activity. In
Sante Fe, the Supreme Court held that a merger could not be challenged under these provisions on
the basis of claimed unfairness. Rather, some element of manipulation or deception must serve as a
prerequisite to applicability of these federal statutes.
Despite the limiting effect of Santa Fe, in Mobil Corp. v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th
Cir. 1981), the Sixth Circuit found room for federal regulation of target board actions. In Mobil,
Marathon attempted to defeat Mobil's tender by contracting to sell out to United States Steel Corpo-
ration as a "white knight," the tender by U.S. Steel being contingent upon Marathon's agreement to
sell ten million treasury shares to it and to sell Marathon's "crown jewel" oil field to it if Marathon
was acquired by a third party. The Sixth Circuit held that the two options granted to U.S. Steel
constituted "manipulative acts" within the meaning of the Williams Act because both options had
the effect of "circumventing the natural forces of market demand." Id at 376.
94. 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
95. Id. at 2460-61; 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1982).
96. Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 105 S. Ct. 2458 (1985).
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focused on the scope and depth of required disclosures and have di-
rect applicability to the adoption by target corporations of charter
amendments.
The primary issue in proxy disclosure cases is the extent of dis-
closure necessary to satisfy the SEC's antifraud proscription. 97 In
1978, the SEC Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure98 specif-
ically recommended that the SEC's Division of Corporate Finance
screen management antitakeover proposals carefully to insure ade-
quate disclosure to stockholders. 99 Consequently, the Division of
Corporate Finance published guidelines requiring extensive disclosure
when a proxy statement containing an antitakeover amendment is
filed with the Commission. 100 But disclosure is not prohibition or re-
97. The general statutory provision is § 14(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78n(a) (1982), and is implemented by SEC rule 14a-9, 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (1985), prohibiting
false or misleading proxy statements.
98. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERSTATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 95TH CONG., IST SEss., RE-
PORT OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE DISCLOSURE To THE SECURITIES AND
EXCHANGE COMMISSION 39 (Comm. Print 1977).
99. The Advisory Committee's Digest of its report summarizes the discussion of antitakeover
provisions as follows:
The Advisory Committee believes that the disclosures in proxy statements about man-
agement proposals, particularly those where management may have a conflict of interest,
such as option and other similar type plans, anti-takeover proposals, and plans for going
private, are not always adequate. The Commission should closely review proxy materials
on management proposals and assure that there is adequate discussion of their
disadvantages.
Digest of the Report of the Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure to the Securities and Ex-
change Commission, reprinted in [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 81,357, at
88,663 (Nov. 3, 1977). The specific recommendation is less forceful:
The Commission should direct the SEC staff to review intensively proxy materials
which contain certain management proposals, with a view to requiring more uniform and
adequate disclosure of the advantages and disadvantages of proposals which may substan-
tially affect the interests of shareholders, including disclosure of estimated costs of any
option or similar type plan and the possible impact such plan may have on the behavior of
management.
Id. 81,357, at 88,674.
100. See Disclosure in Proxy and Information Statements; Anti-Takeover or Similar Proposals-
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15230, reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 81,748 (Oct. 13, 1978) [hereinafter cited as SEC Release]. The Division of Corporate
Finance indicated that the instructions in the release were "merely for the guidance of the staff and
[were] subject to revision without formal notice." Id at 80,984. Like all suggestions from a domi-
nant regulatory authority such as the SEC, these "guidelines" have been accepted as a gloss on the
requirements of the statute and regulations. The Release states:
The Advisory Committee on Corporate Disclosure in its report urged the Commission staff
to review closely proxy materials containing anti-takeover proposals in order to ensure that
there is adequate discussion of their disadvantages as well as advantages. In February of
1978, the Commission responded with an indication that the suggestion would be imple-
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striction. These guidelines therefore presume the substantive validity,
under state law, of all such charter amendments or other antitakeover
measures that have been approved by the shareholders.
C. Judicial Review of Antitakeover Actions
The commentators have debated whether the target board could
make any response at all, and the SEC, having only the provisions of
federal law to build upon, is severely limited in proposing a frame-
work for analysis of these activities. Thus, in assessing the validity of
antitakeover activities, the judiciary has not been in an enviable posi-
tion. Both the focus of the scholarly debate and the limitations of
federal law have put tremendous pressure on state corporate law prin-
ciples and their piecemeal application by the courts.
The pressure was compounded by the nature of the American
corporate governance system. Within this codified system the board
of directors is accepted as the policy-making organ of the corpora-
tion.101 The directors' presumed expertise and familiarity with the
corporation's business affairs best enables them to make business deci-
mented administratively and would be the subject of specific instructions to the staff of the
Division of Corporate Finance.
Id. at 80,984 (footnotes omitted). In February 1978, the SEC issued the following statement of
implementation of the Advisory Committee's recommendation:
The Committee also urges the Commission to review closely proxy materials contain-
ing management proposals, particularly those where management may have a conflict of
interest, such as option and other similar type plans, anti-takeover proposals, and plans for
going private, in order to assure that there is adequate discussion of their disadvantages.
These recommendations are being evaluated for possible Commission consideration in
the context of the Commission's re-examination of rules relating to shareholder communi-
cations, shareholder participation in the corporate electoral process, and corporate govern-
ance generally. In addition, the recommendation relating to review of management
proposals, to the extent not already implemented, will be implemented administratively
and will be the subject of specific instructions to the staff of the Division of Corporation
Finance.
Preliminary Response of the Commission to the Recommendations of the Advisory Committee on Cor-
porate Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 5906, reprinted in [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 81,505, at 80,051 (Feb. 15, 1978). Arguably, the SEC suggests in Securities Act
Release No. 5906 that the Advisory Committee's recommendations were to some extent already
implemented. However, it does not explain in what way, nor does Exchange Act Release No. 15,230
indicate that the staff had received any specific instructions prior to the guidelines responding to the
Advisory Committee's recommendation.
101. See, eg., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. Acr ANN. § 8.01 (3d ed. 1985) ("All corporate powers
shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the business and affairs of the corporation man-
aged under the direction of, its board of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of
incorporation.").
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sions that maximize the shareholders' welfare.102 From this starting
point, a judicially created rule has developed which states that the
majority of directors should have the right to determine the business
policy of the corporation, free from judicial second-guessing, so long
as they acted in good faith and without conflict of interest or breach
of trust.10 3 Thus, it is not surprising that the courts charged with
reviewing antitakeover activities began their inquiry from this
perspective. 104
102. See United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261, 263-64 (1917)
("Courts interfere seldom to control such discretion intra vires the corporation. ... ); Miller v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 507 F.2d 759, 762 (3d Cir. 1974) ("[TIhe sound business judgment rule
. . . expresses the unanimous decision of American courts to eschew intervention in corporate deci-
sion-making .... "); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 782 (Del. 1981) ("[Ihe 'business
judgment' rule evolved to give recognition and deference to directors' business expertise when exer-
cising their managerial power .. "); Selheimer v. Manganese Corp., 423 Pa. 563, 224 A.2d 634,
644 (1966) ("[C]ourts are reluctant to interfere in the internal management of a corporation, since
that is a matter for the discretion and judgment of the directors and shareholders. ... ).
103. See, e.g., Regenstein v. J. Regenstein Co., 213 Ga. 157, 97 S.E.2d 693, 695 (1957) ("No
principle of law is more firmly fixed in our jurisprudence than the one which declares that the courts
will not interfere in matters involving merely the judgment of the majority in exercising control over
corporate affairs."); Neidert v. Neidert, 637 S.W.2d 296, 301 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) ("[Wlhere the
matter under consideration is one that calls for the business judgment of a board of directors or of
the majority shareholders and if this judgment is exercised fairly and honestly courts will not
interfere.").
104. An early federal appellate court decision highlights the strength of this premise. Johnson
v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981), involved a battle for
control of a closely-held corporation where a challenge was made to the proposed sale of new shares
to someone loyal to the majority owners. The minority shareholders alleged that the corporate
directors were acting under a desire to remain in control and were therefore not acting in the corpo-
ration's best interests as it relates to all the shareholders. A bench trial resulted in a victory for the
defendants.
As a case for setting a standard of strict scrutiny or even prohibition of director actions in the
context of a battle for corporate control, Trueblood was an unlikely candidate. First, although the
case admittedly involved an aspect a loss of corporate control, this issue arose in the context of a
close corporation. Unlike control battles involving publicly-held corporations, these partnerships in
corporate clothes have participants who wear multiple hats. The defendants were both majority
shareholders and directors. Even the most ardent antitakeover commentators modify their propos-
als in the context of the close corporation.
Second, the alleged antitakeover activity-issuance of authorized but unissued corporate
shares-is a recognized function of the corporate board, often sanctioned by statute. Unlike some of
the more recent and ambitious antitakeover devices serving clearly to discriminate between share-
holders or shift total control over potential takeovers to the corporate board, this measure was both
episodic and clearly within board authority under both statute and charter. See also Franz Mfg. Co.
v. EAC Indus. Inc., [current] F. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,405 (Del. Dec. 5, 1985) (purchase of
authorized but unissued shares by target board-created employee stock ownership plan after insur-
gents had gained majority control held ineffective when opposed by new majority).
Finally, the issue before the court was not the general propriety of antitakeover behavior. The
issuance of shares was undeniably made in order to increase the corporation's capital in a time of
financial exigency. Rather, the plaintiffs complained that the shares should have been issued to
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Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 105 exemplifies the solidification of
the business judgment rule in cases involving management responses
to perceived takeover threats. In Panter, Marshall Field was ap-
proached, as it had been in the past, concerning its interest in a
merger. Marshall Field is publicly traded and its management previ-
ously had pursued a course which avoided combination with other
entities. When Carter Hawley Hale (CHH) made a tender offer, Mar-
shall Field once again determined to remain independent. To carry
out its objective, Field first made acquisitions that were designed to
cause antitrust problems for CHH and then sued to enjoin the tender
offer because it would result in violations of the antitrust laws.
The court's focus in Panter was on the initial decision of the
board to fight the offer. The means used, purchase of additional retail
outlets and the initiation of legal proceedings, were actions that gener-
ally are recognized as being safely within the discretion of a com-
pany's board of directors.10 6 The plaintiff, however, attacked the use
of these otherwise accepted powers in the context of a control strug-
gle. The Seventh Circuit predictably held that the "desire to build
value within the company, and the belief that such value might be
diminished by a given offer is a rational business purpose."10 7
A significant shift in antitakeover activities, however, has oc-
curred between Panter and the most recent cases. The means adopted
by a board of directors to retain its control of a target corporation
have become increasingly discriminatory in effect, causing disparities
in treatment of otherwise comparably situated shareholders. In addi-
them, resulting in a shift of corporate control, instead of to a third party. The plaintiffs did not
challenge the board's authority and did not claim that the board had usurped power or discriminated
between current shareholders. Rather, they alleged that the refusal of the board to turn over control
to the plaintiffs evidenced an improper motivation for the particular manner in which the shares
were issued.
Given the context, the analysis of the Third Circuit was predictable and correct. With the issue
framed as one of motivation, the court relied on the well-worn and clearly applicable proposition
that "directors of a corporation are presumed to exercise their business judgment in the best interest
of the corporation." Trueblood, 629 F.2d at 292. Further, the court rejected as unworkable and ill-
advised plaintiffs' claim that any motivation to retain control served to rebut this presumption. "Yet
by the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain amount of self-interest in everything he
does. The very fact that the director wants to enhance corporate profits is in part attributable to his
desire to keep shareholders satisfied so that they will not oust him." Id. In short, unless a challenger
demonstrates "that the sole or primary motive of the defendant was to retain control," id. at 293, the
presumption of proper motivation afforded by the business judgment rule applies. Id. at 292-93.
105. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cerL denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
106. Id. at 297-98.
107. Id. at 296.
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tion, the means employed by target management to prevent or resist
takeover consideration have focused more on limiting shareholder dis-
cretion, whereby a board attempts to create a regime of corporate bar-
riers and board prerogatives so that incumbent management has
plenary power to approve all changes in corporate ownership and
control.
While target management has enhanced the sophistication and
discrimination of its antitakeover tools, the courts have continued to
focus primarily on the propriety of the board's decision to resist a
particular hostile suitor. In essence, the board's decision to retain the
corporation's independence, because it deems an offer "inadequate",
has been used by the courts to justify giving the board a free hand to
effect this decision by whatever means the board believes necessary.
As a result of collapsing these two issues into one, fundamental corpo-
rate governance principles have been compromised.
Nowhere is the pernicious effect of the current trend of antitake-
over devices more evident than in two very recent cases decided by
the Delaware Supreme Court.108 In Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Pe-
troleum Co., 10 9 the court addressed the defensive maneuvers taken by
Unocal in response to a tender offer by Mesa. Mesa sought fifty-one
percent of Unocal's shares and was willing to pay fifty-four dollars per
share. Unocal responded by making its own tender at seventy-two
dollars per share. By its terms, however, this self-tender excluded
Mesa and all of its affiliates from participation.
Initially, the Delaware Chancery Court had granted a temporary
restraining order against Unocal's self-tender offer. 110 As Mesa
presented the case, the propriety of Unocal's decision to fight Mesa
was properly separated from the validity of the means employed to
wage the battle. "Mesa does not dispute the bona fides of Unocal's
decision to oppose its tender offer. However, Mesa contends that the
business judgment rule has no application in deciding the validity of
the defensive technique chosen by Unocal.""' Rather, Mesa con-
tended, and the chancery court found, that discrimination among
shareholders must be justified by a showing that the exclusion was fair
to all concerned. As determined by the chancery court, such discrim-
108. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
109. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
110. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal, Corp., No. 7997, slip op. at 6 (Del. Ch. Apr. 29, 1985),
rev'd, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
111. Id.
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ination could not be upheld solely because it involved a battle for con-
trol. "In other words, legally or equitably impermissible conduct
cannot be justified by the fact that it was motivated by a proper pur-
pose." 112 The end sought by Unocal did not necessarily justify the
means it used to achieve that end.
The Delaware Supreme Court approached the issue differently,
however. The court applied only one standard to evaluate the very
separate issues of the decision to fight and the means adopted. The
supreme court viewed the standard of review of the means employed
as subsumed in the propriety of resistance. Once the propriety of the
decision to resist is established, any means "reasonably related to the
threats posed" 113 is justified, even if it discriminates among
shareholders:
In conclusion, there was directorial power to oppose the Mesa tender
offer, and to undertake a selective stock exchange made in good faith and
upon a reasonable investigation pursuant to a clear duty to protect the
corporate enterprise. Further, the selective stock repurchase plan chosen
by Unocal is reasonable in relation to the threat that the board rationally
and reasonably believed was posed by Mesa's inadequate and coercive
two-tier tender offer. Under those circumstances, the board's action is
entitled to be measured by the standards of the business judgment rule.
Thus, unless it is shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
directors' decisions were primarily based on perpetuating themselves in
office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty such as fraud, overreaching,
lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a Court will not substitute its
judgment for that of the board. 114
The second Delaware case, Moran v. Household International,
Inc.,115 involved a defensive device known as a Preferred Share
Purchase Rights Plan, 116 or "poison pill." Under the terms of the
Plan, Household shareholders were entitled to one "Right" for every
common share held, upon either (1) the announcement of a tender
offer for thirty percent or more of Household's shares, or (2) the ac-
quisition of twenty percent or more of Household's shares by any sin-
gle entity or group. 1 7 The "Rights" were redeemable by Household's
board of directors for fifty cents per right if a thirty percent tender
offer was announced, but they became nonredeemable if anyone ac-
112. Id. at 7.
113. Unocal Corporation v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985).
114. Id. at 958.
115. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
116. Id. at 1348.
117. Id.
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quired twenty percent or more of Household's shares.' 18 Most impor-
tantly, if a merger or consolidation occurred, the holder could
exercise the "Right" and purchase two hundred dollars of the com-
mon stock of the tender offeror or other acquiring entity for one hun-
dred dollars."19
Moran is unusual in several respects. First, the Rights Plan was
prophylactic in nature, since it was not adopted during a battle for
corporate control. Second, in an unprecedented move, the SEC filed
an amicus curiae brief which supported the challenge to the Plan.120
Finally, unlike the selective self-tender offer at issue in Unocal, in Mo-
ran the Delaware Supreme Court was presented with a defensive
mechanism which, although adopted by the board of directors, had
fundamental effects on the structure of the corporation and the sepa-
ration of functions between the shareholders and the board.
Rejecting arguments to the contrary, the Delaware Supreme
Court upheld the Rights Plan in Moran. Preliminarily, the court
turned aside the claim that the Household board of directors did not
have statutory authority to adopt the Plan.1 2 ' The court then focused
on the substantive effect of the Plan. As phrased by the SEC, "the
Rights Plan will deter not only two-tier offers, but virtually all hostile
tender offers."' 122 In sum, it was argued that this poison pill made any
unapproved merger or consolidation prohibitively expensive, thus
changing Household's fundamental structure by deterring any sub-
stantial hostile share acquisition not approved by the company's
board. The Delaware Supreme Court refuted the claim that no hos-
tile tender offers would be attempted after the adoption of this Plan by
pointing to Sir James Goldsmith's takeover of Crown Zellerbach Cor-
poration, since Crown Zellerbach had had a poison pill provision sim-
ilar to the one at issue in Moran. 123
118. Id. at 1349.
119. Id
120. Id. at 1348.
121. Statutory authority for creation of the Plan came from sections 15 1(g) and 157 of the
Delaware General Corporation Law. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(g), 157 (1983). The court had
some trouble with the fact that the "Rights" were not operative to purchase Household's shares, but
rather to purchase the shares of some as yet unidentified hostile suitor. The court analogized the
"Rights" to "anti-destruction" or "anti-dilution" provisions which sometimes accompany corporate
securities, finding the Household "Rights" to be sufficiently like these latter devices to be valid
against a hostile suitor. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1352.
122. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
123. Id. For a more detailed discussion of the Goldsmith battle with Crown Zellerbach, in-
cluding a showing that the Delaware Supreme Court's reliance on that scenario for its conclusion in
Moran was misplaced, see infra notes 167-84 and accompanying text.
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The court also rejected the claim that the Plan gave substantial
new power to Household's board to deter hostile share acquisitions.
With respect to the "governance structure" of the company, the court
noted that the board did not have absolute discretion in determining
whether to redeem the "Rights", 24 but it focused primarily on the
question of the Plan's effect on the "value structure" of the com-
pany-which the court found to be minimally affected.1 25 Quoting
language from its Unocal decision, the court then approved the Plan
because the board's adoption of the Plan was protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule.126
As evidenced by Unocal and Moran, court review of antitakeover
measures has resulted in minimal scrutiny of these actions, whether
employed in the context of a current control battle or adopted as a
preventive device. Once a corporate board expresses concern about
allegedly coercive takeover techniques, there is little to limit the
board's ability to adopt almost any defensive mechanism. Conse-
quently, the board may discriminate among shareholders, or deter
third parties from purchasing shareholders' interests at a premium,
because the board's actions are shielded by the protective cloak of the
business judgment rule.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING
ANTITAKEOVER ACTIVITY
The role of shareholders in the modern public corporation is not
large. The shareholders "own" the corporation, but they do not run
it. The board of directors makes policy and manages the business of
the enterprise. The corporate management, officers and other em-
ployees carry out the directions of the board and effectively make pol-
icy on a continual basis. 127
The statutory powers allocated to the shareholders are limited.
The holders elect and remove directors, 1 28 make or amend the charter
or the bylaws,1 29 and undertake organic changes in the corporate
124. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1356-57.
127. See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS-CASES AND MATERIALS
137-38 (5th ed. 1980).
128. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 211(b), 141(k) (1983).
129. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 109, 242 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 10.20
(Smith-Hurd 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 803(a) (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
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structure (such as a merger,130 the sale of substantially all of the assets
of the business,1 31 or a dissolution13 2). These powers give meaning to
the basic right of the shareholders-to vote and control the structure
of their enterprise. According to the corporate norm, the "owners," if
unhappy, can dispense with their representatives, or seek to change
the scope or direction of the enterprise through a merger or sale.
Thus, while the corporate managers conduct the ordinary business
operations, the holders theoretically make the decisions which sub-
stantially change the structure of the enterprise.
Even when exercising these traditional functions, however,
shareholder power is constrained in many states by the requirement
that the board act first to propose the action.133 Where no statutory
provision directly affects shareholder voting power by requiring board
initiative, incumbent management has moved to limit the scope of
shareholder action through bylaw changes which limit the ability of
the "owners" to meet and vote. 134 The impetus for these actions is, on
the one hand, to recognize the norm of shareholder control over such
fundamental issues while, on the other, providing precious little op-
portunity for the actual exercise of that control.
These statutory provisions and procedural alterations have insu-
lated management from challenge substantially more than even the
traditional corporate norm would dictate. 135 Moreover, there appears
to be little dispute over the purpose behind such insulation. These
shareholder activities relate to fundamental changes in the corporate
structure and in the allocation of power among the corporate organs.
The ability of the shareholders to alter these aspects of the legal and
economic constitution of the business threatens incumbent manage-
130. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 11.05, 11.15,
11.20 (Smith-Hurd 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 902, 903 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85).
131. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, 11.60 (Smith-
Hurd 1985); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 909 (McKinney Supp. 1984-85).
132. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, f 12.10, 12.15
(Smith-Hurd 1985).
133. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 242(b)(1) (1983) (charter amendment). Compare
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 803(a), 1001 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1984-85) (charter amendment and
dissolution may be undertaken without board action or approval) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 903
(McKinney Supp. 1984-85) (board approval necessary for merger). See Manne, Some Theoretical
Aspects of Share Voting, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1427, 1437 (1964) (questioning necessity of board
approval).
134. This can be done by limiting the timing and scope of special shareholder meetings and by
restricting the topics for action at all meetings by imposing notice requirements or other obstacles.
See generally Hochman & Folger, supra note 25.
135. See generally M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 1-6 (1976).
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ment. Thus, "structural decisions almost invariably give rise to man-
agement conflicts-of-interest." 136  The response of corporate
management is predictable-attempt to limit the ability of the share-
holders to engage in these activities.
Two developments over the past several decades have hindered
the ability of incumbent management to protect completely against
ouster by the shareholders: the aggregation of stock in the hands of
institutional investors and the rise of the tender offer. The consolida-
tion of substantial holdings in the hands of professional investors pro-
vides the potential for an ongoing check on management discretion
within the corporate body.1 37 In contrast, tender offers act as an ex-
ternal monitoring mechanism on incumbent management. 138
The recent increase in defensive measures is a response to the
threat posed to incumbent management by these two developments.
To the extent that management can impede the change in control
which proxy contests and takeover bids portend, management secur-
ity is enhanced. To the extent that the board of directors can preempt
such threats, security is guaranteed.
It is the position of this Article that the key to analyzing manage-
ment antitakeover activities is to examine the specific defensive meas-
ures employed by a target corporation in light of the traditional
statutory and judicial principles of corporate organization and opera-
tion. The framework of analysis proposed by this Article flows from
four discrete and findamental principles of corporate governance.
First, within the ambit of authorizing corporate expenditures and
making other traditional business decisions, the actions of the board
of directors of a corporation are insulated from review by the business
judgment rule. Second, where corporate actions discriminate among
members of the same class of shareholders, such discrimination, if not
136. Id. at 30. See generally Donaldson, Financial Goals: Management vs. Stockholders, 141
HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1963, at 116, 121; Manne, Mergers and the Market For Corporate
Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
137. "[W]e have now reached the tertiary stage of capitalism. Control of the American busi-
ness passed from the founder-shareholders to the professional managers who held sway until the
1970's and now, at least in the sense of ability to control in the event of a tender offer or a proxy
context, to the professional managers of pension funds, foundations and mutual funds." Lipton,
supra note 15, at 114. See generally Berle, The Modern Corporation Revisited, 64 COLUM. L. REV.
1410 (1964); BERLE & MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
There is dispute over the efficacy of this check. See Coffee, supra note 22, at 1183-92 (summarizing
the dispute in the case of charter amendments).
138. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and Shareholders'
Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981).
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per se invalid, must be justified under a standard of intrinsic fairness.
Third, actions which effect an institutionalized shift in control from
the shareholders to the board, for decisions reserved by statute to the
shareholders, are presumptively invalid. Fourth, actions which effect
an institutionalized shift in control from the majority to the minority
of the shareholders, for decisions reserved by statute to the majority,
are presumptively invalid.
These principles have worked well as a guide to the validity of a
variety of behavior in the traditional context of corporate operations.
There is no reason to abandon these principles simply because the
current context involves a possible change in corporate control.
Rather, if applied properly, these principles provide a comprehensive
and understandable framework for judicial or regulatory analysis, not
only of measures that have previously found their way into the an-
titakeover arsenal, but also as a prescriptive guide to the legality of
proposed actions. In the next four sections, this Article presents such
a framework and applies these principles to the panoply of defensive
measures in use today.
A. The Role of Management Business Discretion in Relation to
Hostile Share Acquisitions
When a challenge is made to the activity of corporate managers,
the business judgment rule accords a presumption of regularity to
their decisions.139 Absent a showing of fraud, bad faith, self-dealing,
139. Next, the plaintiffs argue that the district court improperly charged the jury on their
burden in overcoming the business judgment rule. That rule, which admittedly is part of
the law of Delaware, provides that directors of a corporation are presumed to exercise their
business judgment in the best interest of the corporation ....
. . . It is frequently said that directors are fiduciaries. Although this statement is true
in some senses, it is also obvious that if directors were held to the same standard as ordi-
nary fiduciaries the corporation could not conduct business. For example, an ordinary
fiduciary may not have the slightest conflict of interest in any transaction he undertakes on
behalf of the trust. Yet by the very nature of corporate life a director has a certain amount
of self-interest in everything he does. The very fact that the director wants to enhance
corporate profits is in part attributable to his desire to keep shareholders satisfied so that
they will not oust him.
The business judgment rule seeks to alleviate this problem by validating certain situa-
tions that otherwise would involve a conflict of interest for the ordinary fiduciary. The rule
achieves this purpose by postulating that if actions are arguably taken for the benefit of the
corporation, then the directors are presumed to have been exercising their sound business
judgment rather than responding to any personal motivations.
Faced with the presumption raised by the rule, the question is what sort of showing
the plaintiff must make to survive a motion for directed verdict. Because the rule presumes
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or lack of adequate investigation, courts will refuse to second guess
the advisability of the decisions made by the corporate managers. 4°
Whether justified as necessary to attract competent directors,14 1 to en-
sure dynamic corporate decisionmaking, 42 or as a recognition of the
inability of the courts to evaluate business decisions, 1 43 the underlying
principle is that managers will run businesses better if granted broad
discretion.
The rationale for the business judgment rule also defines its lim-
that business judgment was exercised, the plaintiff must make a showing from which a
factfinder might infer that impermissible motives predominated in the making of the deci-
sion in question.
Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cerL denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981). See
generally Manning, supra note 47; Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholders
Derivative Actions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAW. 27, 32 (1981).
140. See, eg., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980); Auerbach v.
Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27 (1979); Cheffv. Mathes,
41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (1964). The Second Circuit has observed that "an automobile
driver who makes a mistake in judgment as to speed or distance injuring a pedestrian will likely be
called upon to respond in damages," but "a corporate officer who makes a mistake in judgment as to
economic conditions, consumer tastes or production line efficiency will rarely, if ever, be found liable
for damages suffered by the corporation." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert.
denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
141. See, eg., Percy v. Millaudon, 8 Mart. (n.s.) 68, 78 (La. 1829). See also Briggs v. Spauld-
ing, 141 U.S. 132, 149 (1891).
142. See Cramer v. General Tel. & Elec. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 274 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied,
439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Levin v. Mississippi River Corp., 59 F.RD. 353, 364 (S.D.N.Y.), ajf'd without
opinion sub nom., Wesson v. Mississippi River Corp., 486 F.2d 1398 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1112 (1973). Business entails risktaking, and it is thus in the shareholders' interest "that the law not
create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions." Joy v. North, 692 F.2d at 886.
143. It appears to us that the business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in
the prudent recognition that courts are ill-equipped and infrequently called on to evaluate
what are and must be essentially business judgments. The authority and responsibilities
vested in corporate directors both by statute and decisional law proceed on the assumption
that inescapably there can be no available objective standard by which the correctness of
every corporate decision may be measured, by the courts or otherwise. Even if that were
not the case, by definition the responsibility for business judgments must rest with the
corporate directors; their individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for
the discharge of that responsibility.
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702 (2d Cir. 1980). Accord Joy v. North, 692
F.2d at 886:
[A]fter-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business deci-
sions. The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not easily reconstructed in
a courtroom years later, since business imperatives often call for quick decision, inevitably
based on less than perfect information. The entrepreneur's function is to encounter risks
and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned decision at the time made may seem a wild
hunch viewed years later against a background of perfect knowledge.
See also Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1004, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926-27
(1979).
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its. A corporation's managers must be free to make business decisions
that affect the profitability of the company and the value of its shares.
They, directly or through their subordinates, commit to contracts, au-
thorize new lines of production, determine salaries, obtain additional
financing and generally determine business policy for the enterprise.
They are hired to enhance shareholder equity by making these deci-
sions and their actions may have the effect of decreasing that equity.
Within the ambit of making business decisions which relate to the
ultimate value of the corporation and the derivative value of its
shares, corporate management enjoys the benefit of the business judg-
ment rule.
This principle should not change merely because of a takeover
threat. The business judgment rule properly applies in this context
with respect to two decisions made by the board of directors. First,
the initial decision to either accept or attempt to defeat a takeover
effort, a decision which has been the subject of most of the debate
about defensive maneuvers, is clearly one that affects shareholders eq-
uity and possibly the continued viability and profitability of the enter-
prise. Despite the perspective of the managerial passivity proponents,
no court has yet concluded that such a decision is not governed by the
business judgment rule. Second, the decision to employ a particular
means of defense may also be protected by the rule. Where the action
taken is consonant with traditional management powers, such as mak-
ing acquisitions, initiating law suits, or issuing authorized shares, and
has no effect other than the possible enhancement or dilution of the
company's value, the fact that such action occurs in the context of a
battle for corporate control is irrelevant. As with other business deci-
sions, such tactics must survive on their own merits, subject to scru-
tiny only for failure of a duty of care.
1. The Decision to Resist or Deter Hostile Suitors
Applying the business judgment rule to the preliminary decision
to deter a takeover is not erroneous because the issues of control and
corporate policy cannot readily be separated. Like other decisions
bearing on the value of the shareholders' investment, the decision by
incumbent management to retain control and pursue a continuation
of current corporate policy has been accepted by the courts as a deci-
sion within the management's discretion.144
144. See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 295 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382-84 (2d Cir. 1980); Crouse-
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To conclude that the business judgment rule applies to the pre-
liminary issue of resistance, however, merely begins the analysis. As
with other decisions committed to the discretion of management, the
requisites of the business judgment rule must be satisfied. This means,
primarily, that management must actually make a decision. That is, if
incumbent management enjoys the prerogative of passing upon such
offers and overtures, management must meet the concomitant respon-
sibility of actually reviewing these options in good faith and with due
care. The business judgment rule "has no role where directors have
either abdicated their functions, or absent a conscious decision, failed
to act." 145
With respect to hostile share acquisitions and changes in corpo-
rate control, the requirement that management actually exercise its
discretion has a clear role. A policy or mechanism which has the
purpose or effect of precluding consideration of any and all takeover
offers simply is not protected by the business judgment rule. Abdica-
tion of discretion is not the exercise of discretion. Incumbent man-
agement cannot declare that maintaining the status quo is a
preemptory principle of its review of takeover proposals.
While it may seem a rare circumstance where proof of such a
position or practice may occur, actual corporate maneuvers may
speak more clearly than corporate policy statements. In Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co. 146 the primary claim was that "the defendants
breached their fiduciary duty as directors to the corporation and its
shareholders by adopting a secret policy to resist acquisition regard-
Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690, 702-03 (2d Cir. 1980); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287, 293 (3d Cir. 1980), cert denied, 450 U.S. 999 (1981); Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del.
1984); Edelman v. Phillips Petroleum Co., No. 7899, slip op. (Del. Ch. Feb. 12, 1985). See also
Lipton, supra note 15, at 120 (A board's decision whether to oppose a takeover bid "is no different
than any other fundamental business decision.").
A corollary of this proposition is that directors may negotiate with hostile suitors or with third
parties. Indeed, some otherwise staunchly anti-management commentators applaud management
efforts to create an auction market for the company's stock. The view is that an auction will increase
the benefit to shareholders by raising the price offered for their shares. See, eg., Bebchuk, supra note
26; Gilson, supra note 26, at 868-75. See also supra note 28. As with other aspects of the debate on
the fundamental, but preliminary issue, there is a divergence of opinion among the commentators.
Compare Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 34 with Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing
Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. Rnv. 23 (1982) and Gilson, supra note 35.
145. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984). Accord Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Kaplan v. Centex Corp., 284 A.2d 119, 124 (Del. Ch. 1971). See generally
Arsht, Fiduciary Responsibilities of Directors, Officers, and Key Employees, 4 DEL. J. CORP. L. 652,
659 (1979).
146. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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less of benefit to the shareholders."'' 47 While the Seventh Circuit
found that the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to reach
the jury on this issue, 48 nonetheless, the possibility exists that such a
showing may be made in a future case. 49
2. Implementing the Antitakeover Decision
If the incumbent management decided not to facilitate a hostile
takeover attempt, but did not act to prevent such an occurrence, even
the most extreme critics of antitakeover activity would be satisfied. 150
Such a scenario, however, is highly unlikely. Indeed, it may be part of
management's duty to actively resist proposals that management does
not consider to be in the best interests of the shareholders. Several
courts have indicated that current management has just such an
obligation. 151
Properly applied, the business judgment rule has a real, albeit
limited, role in the review of the means adopted or recommended by
management to deter a corporate takeover. If managerial discretion is
147. Id. at 293.
148. Id. at 295-97. The Seventh Circuit's conclusion on this issue is questionable. The court
determined that, since each prior rejection of an offer was individually protected by the business
judgment rule, the series of rejections was likewise protected. The majority of the court failed to
recognize that the sum of the parts might, as a whole, prove what each part alone failed to show. See
id. at 299, 304-310 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
149. Beyond the breach of fiduciary duty apparent from an unremitting refusal to consider all
hostile offers, the directors' duty of care applies also to the decision to resist any individual overture.
Directors are required to reach an informed business judgment before taking action. The principle
has equal applicability to the decision to reject a particular transaction. Particularly in the context
of a tender offer where time and timing are crucial, the claim of breach of duty through failure to
make an informed decision may be successful. See, eg., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisi-
tion, Inc., [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 1j 92,418 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 1986) (approval of lock-up
option in a three-hour late-night meeting not exercise of informed business judgment). Condec
Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 25 Del. Ch. 247, 230 A.2d 769, 776 (1967) ("I do not find that type of
direct investigation, professional consultation or evidence of contradiction in the actions and expla-
nations on the part of Condec officials which would lead the management of Lunkenheimer justifia-
bly to believe that Condec's aspirations represented a reasonable threat to the continued existence of
Lunkenheimer."). See generally Lipton, supra note 15, at 120-30 (prescribing steps to be taken by
board of directors in evaluating takeover proposal).
150. This is the essence of the claim for "managerial passivity." See supra text accompanying
notes 26-37.
151. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 486 F. Supp. 1168, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd, 646
F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981) ("Having so decided in good faith, with
rational business purposes attributable to their decision, defendants had not only the right 'but the
duty to resist by all lawful means persons whose attempt to win control of the corporation, if suc-
cessful, would harm the corporate enterprise.' ") (quoting Heit v. Baird, 567 F.2d 1157, 1161 (1st
Cir. 1977)); Harman v. Willbern, 374 F. Supp. 1149, 1159 (D. Kan. 1974), affd, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th
Cir. 1975); Northwest Indus., Inc. v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 301 F. Supp. 706, 712 (N.D. Il. 1969).
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to have any meaning in the corporate context, management must be
free to make business decisions which, for better or worse, enhance or
deplete the value of the corporation and the derivative value of the
shareholders' investment. Monetary expenditures and entry into con-
tractual arrangements, for example, are activities committed to man-
agement discretion. These activities also have the potential to
decrease the intrinsic value of the corporation and traditionally, ab-
sent some ancillary effect (for example, discrimination among share-
holders or infringement upon areas reserved by charter or statute to
the shareholders), such activities have been protected by the business
judgment rule.
The business judgment rule should continue to govern these
traditional activities, irrespective of whether they arise or operate in
the takeover context. Consider a simple but highly controversial ex-
ample, the golden parachute. Substantively, these agreements are
simply compensation arrangements for corporate management. Such
compensation decisions are committed firmly to board discretion by
statute.1 52 Moreover, these agreements, like all compensation agree-
ments, have the possible effect of depleting the corporate treasury if
value is not received in return.
Subject to a showing that the terms of such agreements are so ill-
advised as to constitute a waste of corporate assets,153 the decision to
employ golden parachutes is protected by the business judgment rule.
It is difficult to see how any stricter standard of review can be applied
to these agreements merely because they have operative effect only
upon a change in corporate control. The question is whether such
compensation agreements are reasonable and necessary to retain or
attract quality corporate management. That they may deter a possi-
ble takeover, however, is not unlike the acquisitions in Panter.
Outside of the takeover context, acquisitions and golden parachutes
are merely traditional business decisions. Within the context of a bat-
tle for corporate control their essential nature remains the same.154
152. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(h) (1983).
153. Compare Hingle v. Plaquemines Pit Sales Corp., 399 So. 2d 646 (La. Ct. App. 1981), writ
denied, 401 So. 2d 987 (La. 1981) with Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. Ct. App. 1970).
Such agreements might be attacked as invalid simply because there is no consideration supplied for
the benefit conferred. See Riger, supra note 45.
154. This does not mean that all board activity within traditional powers and which does no
more than affect shareholder equity is immune from attack. The business judgment rule has its
limits in all contexts. Norlin Corp. v. Rooney, Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255 (2d Cir. 1984), is exemplary.
Fearing a takeover attempt following an outsider's purchase of 32% of Norlin's stock, Norlin's
board transferred approximately 1,000,000 shares to a subsidiary and an employee stock ownership
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Whether designated as defensive maneuvers or simply business
decisions, the business judgment rule may apply initially to a host of
activities by the target board. The key to its applicability is the role of
plan (ESOP). No real consideration was received for the transferred shares and the board issued the
shares despite a warning from the New York Stock Exchange that the company's stock would be
delisted, which it was.
The Second Circuit enjoined these activities, despite the board's claim of protection by the
business judgment rule. Initially, the court properly separated the decision to remain independent
from the means employed to effect that result. Second, the court found that the means employed
could not be justified even though all of the actions taken were within traditional management
power:
The precipitous timing of the share issuances, and the fact that the ESOP was created the
very same day that stock was issued to it, give rise to a strong inference that the purpose of
the transaction was not to benefit the employees. . . . This is buttressed by the fact that
the board offered its shareholders no rationale for the transfers other than its determination
to oppose, at all costs, the threat to the company that Piezo's acquisitions ostensibly repre-
sented.
. . . No real consideration was received from the ESOP for the shares.
. . . In addition, Norlin's assertion [that delisting was not relevant because the stock
would still be traded on the NASDAQ] does not contradict Judge Edelstein's finding that
"delisting of securities generally is a serious loss of prestige and has a chilling effect on
prospective buyers."
Id. at 265-66, 268.
This analysis by the court in Norlin is persuasive evidence of how the business judgment rule
may be rebutted in the takeover context, even where the actions taken are within normal manage-
ment discretion. While correct in result, the analysis of the court is flawed in one respect, namely
that the court used the context of these actions, rather than their extremely deleterious effect alone,
as grounds for finding the business judgment rule inapplicable.
This focus on the context of the activity-finding an action to be invalid if the "primary pur-
pose" is to retain control-is unworkable and unnecessary. Any action in the context of a control
battle (and many measures outside that context) will have ramifications which affect the result of
that battle. Identifying the circumstances where the motive to retain that control are primary simply
provides the opportunity for arbitrary invalidation of such measures.
Moreover, as evidenced by Norlin, such a distinction does not materially assist in an analysis of
the propriety of corporate activity. Management's actions in Norlin were indefensible under the
business judgment rule. Any exercise of otherwise traditional management power to diminish the
value of the corporation with no possible business justification is simply a breach of fiduciary duty.
To attempt to identify and separate the motivational force behind these actions adds nothing to the
analysis.
More fundamentally, the development of the primary purpose test was based on an analytical
misperception. Courts originally employing this test did so because they perceived the issues of the
decision to fight and the means adopted as the same. They were not about to require managerial
passivity in all circumstances. The primary purpose test was thus adopted as a limitation, albeit
insignificant, on management discretion.
As argued herein, however, these two issues are not only separable but indeed must be separated
to make sense of the analysis of antitakeover activity. The decision to resist may be valid but the
means employed may be condemned. With the recognition that the means employed must be inde-
pendently justified, the excess baggage supplied by the primary purpose test can be discarded.
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the board in using corporate assets, or otherwise exercising traditional
corporate powers, in a manner that does not alter the basic division of
authority within the corporation and that treats all shareholders
equally. That the shareholders' investment may be enhanced or de-
pleted by these actions recognizes the tremendous power allocated to
management in American corporate law.
This conclusion, however, does not mean that all is well with
traditional corporate law jurisprudence. Under the guise of the busi-
ness judgment rule, the courts may have abdicated too much of their
responsibility to enforce the duty of care. Placing some so-called de-
fensive measures into the same category with other management deci-
sions may cause the courts to reconsider their role and scrutinize all
management decisions somewhat more closely. Movement in that di-
rection may be very healthy for all shareholders of modem American
enterprises.
3. Antitakeover Tactics Which the Business Judgment
Rule Protects
This Article has stated that conduct within traditional board dis-
cretion which does not discriminate among comparably situated
shareholders and does not alter the basic divisions of power within the
corporation should be governed by the duty of care and the protection
of the business judgment rule. Among the variety of defensive meas-
ures in vogue today, we can identify a number which should be judged
at least in part by the requirements of the duty of care.
Consider, for example, the retail acquisitions made by the target
board in Panter v. Marshall Field & Co. 155 First, such acquisitions
may create antitrust or other regulatory problems for a potential bid-
der. Additionally, even if no antitrust problems are created, these ac-
quisitions may simply make the potential target company less
desirable as an acquisition candidate. 156 All acquisitions, whether un-
dertaken where a change of control is imminent or in the relative lux-
ury of day-to-day decisionmaking, can have these effects. The key
questions are (1) whether the action is defensible on business grounds
which are independent of a desire to defeat the takeover threat, and
155. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
156. This was the case in Panter, id. at 297; Brascan Ltd. v. Edper Equities Ltd., 477 F. Supp.
773 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Anaconda Co. v. Crane, 411 F. Supp. 1210, 1216-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). If an
acquisition makes a target less desirable as an acquisition candidate generally, this factor may clearly
decrease shareholder value and should be one factor in reviewing the board's decision.
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(2) whether the board carefully considered the acquisition, its price
and alternative uses for the corporation's resources. If these stan-
dards are met, the business judgment rule protects the board from an
error in judgment.1 57 The duty of care has been breached, however,
when these standards are not satisfied.' 58
Also falling within the ambit of traditional management discre-
tion, save for the context of their adoption, are a variety of actions
which generically have been referred to as "scorched earth" poli-
cies.159 One aspect of such a policy is the converse of the acquisitions
in Panter, namely, the divestment of some or all of the company's
assets. Whether such "asset redeployment" occurs by an outright sale
or by the issuance of options, its effect on the value of the corporation
and the justification for the sale is the appropriate focus of review.' 60
157. See, e.g., Bodell v. General Gas & Elec. Corp., 15 Del. Ch. 420, 140 A. 264, 266 (1927)
("The controlling principle is that the substance of a business decision or transaction ... will not be
reviewed or scrutinized by a court as long as the acts of the directors. . . were performed in good
faith, in the exercise of their best judgment, and for what they believed to be the advantage of the
corporation and all its stockholders.").
158. See, eg., Muschel v. Western Union Corp., 310 A.2d 904, 908 (Del. Ch. 1973) (disparity
between the actual price of company stock involved in a merger and a fair price could lead to the
conclusion that the decision to proceed with the merger "was not due to an honest error of judg-
ment, but rather to bad faith, or to reckless indifference to the rights of others interested."). Com-
pare Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 95,863, at 91,131 (C.D. Calif. Nov. 29, 1976) (primary purpose of acquisition by target of
tender offer held to be to create an antitrust obstacle to the bid and for directors to maintain control;
court suggested little or no business justification for acquisition).
159. "A scorched earth defense seeks to convince the offeror that the target's defense will be so
vigorous as to reduce its value to the offeror." Gilson, supra note 46, at 776 n.3.
160. See, e.g., Vhittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982), afl'd without opin-
ion, Nos. 82-1305, 82-1307 (7th Cir. Mar. 3, 1982):
When confronted with a threatened change in control, a board of directors of a target
company may engage in a corporate transaction with a third party that the board deter-
mines in its business judgment to be in the best interests of shareholders. . . . In so doing,
the board of directors may enter into various arrangements with the third party to promote
consummation of the transaction even though to do so might cause the hostile tender of-
feror to withdraw.
Id. at 951. A variation on such options are some types of "crown jewel warrants" which may be
issued to common stockholders or a friendly party by the target corporation. The securities entitle
the holder to purchase certain assets or lines of business at a preferential price. Even in Mobil Corp.
v. Marathon Oil Co., 669 F.2d 366 (6th Cir. 1981), where the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
ruled that section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "Exchange Act") had been
violated by United States Steel in connection with obtaining options from Marathon to purchase a
substantial asset of Marathon, as well as newly issued stock, the circuit court "left undisturbed" the
district court's finding that the directors of Marathon had not breached their fiduciary duty in grant-
ing such options, because such options were granted for a proper corporate purchase: "to obtain the
best possible deal for Marathon shareholders in the face of an inevitable takeover." Marathon Oil
Co. v. Mobil Corp., 530 F. Supp. 315, 325 (N.D. Ohio 1981).
[Vol. 47:407
HOSTILE SHARE ACQUISITIONS
Extreme injury to the corporation by such tactics without a positive
business purpose is simply a breach of fiduciary duty.161
Similarly, where a series of board actions severely harms the cor-
poration, the board should not be able to avoid liability by claiming
that each action alone might simply be ill-advised. There is a differ-
ence between an isolated bad business judgment and a policy of de-
struction. The cumulative effect of a combination of corporate
actions may be devastating although each measure alone is only
slightly injurious. Where a successful "offeror would be left with
nothing but smoldering ash,"' 162 a court should not hesitate to find a
breach of fiduciary duty.1 63
This Article has adopted the position that board actions should
not be subject to a stricter standard of review simply because a take-
over may be threatened. Conversely, the existence of a takeover
threat, standing alone, does not justify antitakeover actions. This
does not mean that the terms of the takeover proposal are irrelevant
for purposes of satisfying the duty of care as it relates to the means
employed to deter the takeover. The board is still bound to act in the
shareholders' and the corporation's best interest in pursuing possible
alternative courses of action, even where one alternative is a possible
change in control. While the takeover context should not invalidate a
161. Compare Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,418 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 1986) (invalidating lock-up options); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985) (invalidat-
ing lock-up options); and Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 861
(S.D.N.Y. 1981) ("It is inconceivable that an alleged flourishing enterprise has authorized its board
to subject the assets and charter of the company to a scorched earth policy to be accomplished in the
name of an exercise of business judgment."); with Bacine v. Scharffenberger, Nos. 7862, 7866, slip
op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 11, 1984) (denying request for preliminary injunctive relief against consummation
of a sale of assets and liquidation of the corporation, scheduled to be voted upon at special share-
holder meeting on the following day). At its extreme, such policies may result in "corporate sui-
cide," namely, liquidation. See Prentice, Target Board Abuse of Defensive Tactics: Can Federal Law
Be Mobilized To Overcome The Business Judgment Rule?, 8 J. CORP. L. 337, 343 (1983). A valid
basis for refusing to sanction such a tactic is that shareholder approval typically is required for such
extreme measures. Compare Katz v. Bregman, 431 A.2d 1274 (Del. Ch. 1981) with Story v. Kenne-
cott Copper Corp., 90 Misc. 2d 333, 394 N.Y.S.2d 353 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See generally Block &
Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in Takeover Contests, 11 SEc.
REG. L.J. 44, 62 (1983). See also GM Sub Corp. v. Liggett Group Inc., No. 6155, slip op. (Del. Ch.
Apr. 25, 1980) (denying a temporary restraining order enjoining the sale of a subsidiary-allegedly
the corporation's prize asset. The court noted that the corporation had engaged an investment bank-
ing firm, that the investment banking firm had solicited nine bids, and that the highest of these bids
was 22 times the earnings of the subsidiary), rev'd on other grounds, 415 A.2d 473 (Del. 1980).
162. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
163. See, eg., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
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particular business decision per se, the takeover proposal does provide
a frame of reference for judging competing options.
Some defensive measures may immediately enhance the target
shareholders' investment vis-a-vis the terms of the hostile takeover.
One example is the attempt to locate a better deal by finding a "white
knight." 164 In these circumstances, the frame of reference is the terms
of the competing hostile bid. It is well recognized that creating an
auction atmosphere may benefit the target shareholders. 165 Thus,
rather than invalidate the friendly offer, the terms of the hostile offer
may provide a substantial justification for undertaking the alternative
transaction. 166
4. Crown Zellerbach Corporation v. Goldsmith- A Classic
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
The battle for control of Crown Zellerbach Corporation, a battle
fought between incumbent management and Sir James Goldsmith,
provides one recent example of how measures within the traditional
authority of the board can be employed to violate the duty of care.167
164. A "white knight" is a corporation that comes to the aid of another corporation which is
the target of a takeover attempt. The "knight" rescues the embattled firm by agreeing to acquire it
on better terms than the pursuer would provide. In some cases, rather than acquiring the target
corporation immediately, the "white knight" is issued options or warrants on the target's stock
which may be exercised or triggered by further hostile actii'ities by the original tender offeror.
165. See supra notes 28 and 144.
166. As a preliminary step to negotiating a competing offer, the potential "white knight" may
require some advantage, eg., a right to buy stock or assets should the friendly arrangement become
fact. These arrangements must also be justified by the adequacy of the board's consideration and the
agreement's reasonableness under the business judgment rule. See Treadway Cos., Inc. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980):
The critical fact, in our view, is that the Treadway board was simply not acting to maintain
its own control over the corporation. Rather, in approving the stock sale, they were mov-
ing Treadway toward a business combination with Fair Lanes. Fair Lanes had made the
stock sale a precondition to further merger talks. From all that appears, Fair Lanes and
Treadway had every intention of carrying through with that merger. Hall testified that
Fair Lanes had been interested for some years in a possible merger with Treadway; and
Care has not offered any evidence to suggest that the merger talks were a sham or a pre-
text, or that the Treadway directors did not seriously wish to pursue the merger.
Id. at 383. Accord Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892 (W.D.N.Y. 1983); Marshall
Field & Co. v. Icahn, [1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,616 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26,
1982). But see Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 92,418 (2d Cir. Jan. 6, 1986) (invalidating lock-up options); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) $ 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985) (granting of
lock-up option found to be breach of fiduciary duty). See generally Rosenzweig, The Legality of
"Lock-Ups" and Other Responses of Directors to Hostile Takeover Bids or Stock Aggregations, 10 SEC.
REG. L.J. 291 (1983).
167. The duty to insure shareholders' interests can likewise validate board recommendations of
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On July 19, 1984, Crown's board issued certain special warrants to its
common shareholders. 168 The fights represented by these warrants
were designed to deter an unfriendly takeover by allowing the holders
to buy two shares of the surviving entity for the price of one. 169 The
rights were not exercisable until someone either acquired twenty per-
cent of the company's stock or made an offer for thirty percent or
more of the stock. 170 Until the rights were triggered, the warrants
could be redeemed by Crown's board for fifty cents each. 171 These
rights are one fairly simple example of a "poison pill."172
In October, 1984, Sir James Goldsmith began to amass shares of
Crown stock. 173 By mid-May, 1985, he held 19.9 percent of these
shares and was threatening to trigger the shareholders' rights, unless
the warrants were redeemed by Crown's board. 74 The board made
no attempt to redeem the warrants, and when Goldsmith purchased
an additional one-tenth of a percent of Crown's stock, he triggered the
rights. 175
As a matter claimed to fall within the proper exercise of business
judgment, 76 the Crown Zellerbach poison pill provision is indefen-
charter provisions. The fair-price provision is a good example. In its simplest form, this charter
provision requires that all shareholders of a corporation subject to a tender offer be paid approxi-
mately the same price for their shares. Such a provision modifies the effects of the two-tiered tender
offer where the offeror offers one price for enough shares to gain control of the target corporation,
and then offers a lesser price to the remaining shareholders once control has been obtained.
Putting aside the possible insulating effect of shareholder approval, recommendation of this type
of fair-price provision by a board of directors could hardly be considered a breach of fiduciary duty.
This type of provision reflects a recognition of the danger of two-tiered tender offers to all sharehold-
ers of the corporation and simply seeks approximate equality of treatment. The business judgment
rule should insulate this and other such affirmative efforts of a target board to protect the company's
shareholders.
168. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Goldsmith, 609 F. Supp. 187 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
169. Id. at 188; Bid For Crown Zellerbach set By Goldsmith, Wall St. J., April 10, 1985, at 2,
col. 2.
170. Crown Zellerbach, 609 F. Supp. at 188.
171. Id.
172. Id. See generally Note, supra note 14.
173. Crown Zellerbach, 609 F. Supp. at 188. In April, 1985, Goldsmith announced a tender
offer for approximately two-thirds of Crown's outstanding shares and made it clear that he was
willing to purchase all of Crown's shares for the same price. Bid For Crown Zellebach set By Gold-
smith, Wall St. J., April 10, 1985, at 2, col. 2. Crown's board rejected the bid and began plans for a
spinoff of certain crucial divisions of the company ("crown jewels"). On April 26, 1985, Goldsmith
withdrew his offer. Crown Zellerbach, 609 F. Supp. at 188.
174. Bid For Crown Zellebach Is Intensified, Wall St. J., May 14, 1985, at 4, col. 2.
175. Goldsmith Is Said To Increase His Stake In Crown Zellerbach To More Than 20%, Wall
St. J., May 15, 1985, at 6, col. 1; Goldsmith's Move On Crown, Zellebach Prompts 'Posion Pill' Po-
tency Questions, Wall St. J., May 16, 1985, at 12, col. 1.
176. In addition to raising duty of care issues, this provision also violated shareholder equality
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sible. The essence of the protection of the business judgment flows
from the exercise of that judgment, namely, making an informed busi-
ness decision. The board, whether deciding to accept or reject such a
merger proposal, must rationally consider the proposal on its merits.
The business judgment rule "has no role where directors have...
abdicated their functions." 177
The Crown board abdicated its statutory duties.1 78 The board
certainly had the power to issue warrants as a matter within its desig-
nated authority, 179 but it breached its fiduciary duty by issuing war-
rants of this type. Once someone acquired twenty percent of the
company, anyone attempting to merge with Crown, whether friendly
or not, would be subject to the provisions of the poison pill. The
rights were no longer redeemable. Once triggered, these rights "effec-
tively preclude[d] Crown from merging with a third party and engag-
ing in certain other transactions."1 80 The board, the shareholders and
the company simply could not entertain any future merger pros-
pects.1 81 The abdication of duty is clear and the extent of harm to the
shareholders is incalculable.1 82
by discriminating among shareholders and corporate principles of distribution of power by shifting
from the shareholders to the board all right to consider whether to sell their shares. See infra text
accompanying notes 185-253.
177. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 813 (Del. 1984).
178. Under Delaware law, as with other states, the board initially passes on merger proposals.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141 (1983) provides, in pertinent part:
(a) The business and affairs of every corporation organized under this chapter shall be
managed by or under the direction of a board of directors, except as may be otherwise
provided in this chapter or in its certificate of incorporation. If any such provision is made
in the certificate of incorporation, the powers and duties conferred or imposed upon the
board of directors by this chapter shall be exercised or performed to such extent and by
such person or persons as shall be provided in the certificate of incorporation.
In the specific context of a proposed merger of domestic corporations, a director has a duty
under DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1983), along with his fellow directors, to act in an informed
and deliberate manner in determining whether to approve an agreement of merger before submitting
the proposal to the stockholders. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 251(b) (1983) provides in pertinent
part: "The board of directors of each corporation which desires to merge or consolidate shall adopt
a resolution approving an agreement of merger or consolidation." (emphasis added).
179. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 151(a), 141(a), 141(c) (1983).
180. Crown Zellerbach, 609 F. Supp. at 188.
181. Goldsmith had to change tactics and attempt to take control from within. See Gold-
smith's Move On Crown Zellerbach Prompts 'Poison Pill' Potency Questions, Wall St. J., May 16,
1985, at 8, col. 1. When Crown threatened to carry out its restructuring plan, Goldsmith increased
his holdings to force a special shareholders' meeting. Goldsmith Boosts Crown Zellerbach Stake To
Over 40%, Wall St. J., July 17, 1985, at 7, col. 3. Crown Zellerbach management finally capitulated,
naming him chairman of the board and giving him a majority of an eleven-member board. Gold-
smith Wins Fight For Crown Zellerbach Corp., Wall St. J., July 26, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
182. Like the converse situation, where an ill-advised merger is accepted, there may be an
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In Moran v. Household International, Inc., the Delaware
Supreme Court cited the battle between Crown Zellerbach and Gold-
smith to counter the SEC's contention that poison pill provisions,
such as those in Moran and Crown Zellerbach, "will deter not only
two-tier offers, but virtually all hostile tender offers."1 83 The Supreme
Court of Delaware contended that Goldsmith's obtaining control of
Crown Zellerbach proves the fallacy of the SEC's contention. But it
is the court's reasoning in Moran that is fallacious. Goldsmith gained
control not by tender offer, but by open market purchases. Moreover,
it is possible that he did so at a much cheaper price than otherwise
practicable precisely because Crown's poison pill, once triggered, de-
terred all "white knights" from rescuing Crown. 184 To the extent that
this was true, Crown's shareholders suffered at the hands of its
board-and Household International's shareholders have the poten-
tial to share in the same dubious distinction.
B. Discrimination Among Shareholders in Target
Defensive Maneuvers
All shareholders of a given class or series of common stock have
an ownership right in the corporation which corresponds to the per-
centage of the common stock owned. This is fundamental to tradi-
tional corporate governance. Among common stockholders, four
rights of ownership are identifying characteristics of their interest.
First, common shareholders have a right to a pro rata share in the
earnings of the corporation, after payments to preference stock, upon
declaration of a dividend by the board of directors. 185 Second, com-
mon shareholders are the residual owners of the corporation. In the
event of the corporation's liquidation, the balance of the corporation's
attempt to determine the fair value of the shares by analogy to the appraisal rights granted in the
merger situation. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985); Weinberger v. UOP, Inc.,
457 A.2d 701, 712-15 (Del. 1983). But the true loss to the shareholders in terms of lost opportunity
can only be a matter of speculation. See supra note 17 for empirical evidence on the returns accruing
to target corporation shareholders from mergers and acquisitions. Moreover, a breach of duty of
care, unlike a clear violation of statutory requisites on allocation of powers or discrimination among
shareholders, is not likely to result in voiding of the rights granted. The claim is not that the board
had no authority to act, but that it acted without due care.
183. Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1354 (Del. 1985).
184. Goldsmith Wins Fight For Crown Zellerbach Corp., Wall St. J., July 26, 1985, at 3, col. 1.
185. See Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1040 (D. Md.
1982); Alliegro v. Pan American Bank, 136 So. 2d 656, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Murphy v.
Country House, Inc., 349 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
LAWS OF CORPORATIONS §§ 72, 124, 158 (3d ed. 1983).
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assets, after payment of creditors and distributions to preferred stock-
holders, belongs to the common shareholders for distribution on a pro
rata basis. 18 6 Third, common shareholders have a right to vote in the
election of directors and upon other matters concerning the govern-
ance of the corporation. 187 Notably, common shareholders must
normally approve business combinations or other fundamental
changes. 188 And fourth, common shareholders normally have pre-
emptive rights so as to retain their pro rata interest in the
enterprise. 189
It is well accepted that directors and management may not con-
fer benefits upon one group of shareholders without doing likewise for
other shareholders in the same class. 190 The rationale for this position
is basic-all shareholders of a given class hold the same claim to cor-
porate assets. They each expect similar pro rata portions of earnings
or corporate wealth to devolve to them in the event of any corporate
186. Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1387 (5th Cir. 1980); Kellogg v. Georgia Pacific Paper
Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719, 722 (W.D. Ark. 1964); Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So. 2d 539, 543 (La. 1983);
Cooke v. Tankersley, 199 Okla. 634, 189 P.2d 417, 419 (1948); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra
note 185, §§ 124, 157, 382, 383.
187. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 185, §§ 124, 157, 189.
188. Id. § 346.
189. Id. §§ 124, 127. It is common practice, however, for the charter specifically to remove
preemptive rights, particularly with respect to the issuance of additional stock in large publicly
traded companies.
190. "Since directors, with respect to their exercise of their management functions, owe fiduci-
ary duties to the corporation to exercise unbiased judgment in the best interests of the corporation as
a whole, any attempt by directors to favor one intracorporate group to the detriment of another
breaches such duties to the corporation and, in a sense, violates the implied term in the share con-
tract between the corporation and any oppressed shareholder to the effect that corporate affairs will
be managed in the best interests of the corporation." Id. § 240, at 652 (footnote omitted). See, eg.,
Delano v. Kitch, 663 F.2d 990, 997-98 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 946 (1982); O'Connor
& Assoc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 529 F. Supp. 1179, 1184 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (directors must
carry out their duties for the common good of all shareholders); Herald Co. v. Bonfils, 315 F. Supp.
497, 502 (D. Colo. 1970) (officers and directors of a corporation owe fiduciary duties to sharehold-
ers); Wright v. Bayly Corp., 41 Colo. App. 313, 587 P.2d 799, 801 (1978) (directors owe fiduciary
duties to shareholders and corporation is bound to protect their interests); Baron v. Allied Artists
Pictures Corp., 337 A.2d 653, 658 (Del. Ch. 1975); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 25 Del. Ch.
247, 230 A.2d 769, 775 (1967); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 473 N.E.2d 19, 26,
483 N.Y.S.2d 667, 674 (1984) (fiduciary must treat all shareholders fairly); Katzowitz v. Sidler, 24
N.Y.2d 512, 249 N.E.2d 359, 363, 301 N.Y.S.2d 470, 475 (1969) (directors of corporation have no
discretion in the choice of those to whom the earnings and assets of the corporation should be
distributed); Loy v. Lorm Corp., 52 N.C. App. 428, 278 S.E.2d 897, 903 (1981) (directors owe a duty
of fidelity and due care to the corporation and all shareholders); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413,
560 P.2d 1086, 1089 (1977) (those in control of corporate affairs have fiduciary duties of good faith
and fair dealing toward the minority shareholders); H. BALLANTINE, CORPORATIONS §§ 43, 72a (2d
ed. 1946); W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 127, at 150-53; Brudney, Equal Treatment of
Shareholders in Corporate Distributions and Reorganizations, 71 CAL. L. REv. 1072, 1074 (1983).
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distributions or the corporation's liquidation.1 91
The most common of corporate distributions, dividend pay-
ments, exemplify the requirement that shareholders of the same class
be treated equally by the corporate directors and officers. Though
most corporate statutes do not deal explicitly with the subject,192 case
law establishes that each shareholder must receive a pro rata distribu-
tion, proportionally equivalent to the amount paid to the remainder of
the security class.193 This requirement conforms to investor expecta-
tions and reduces the risk perceived in purchasing securities by re-
moving uncertainty as to how the investor will be treated in corporate
distributions vis-a-vis other shareholders. Moreover, equality require-
ments are not limited to dividend distributions; they also apply to cor-
porate liquidations.1 94 Thus, equality in all distributions provides an
important check on management's ability to divert assets or control to
a favored group, including itself.
The newest wave of antitakeover defenses wreaks havoc on these
basic rights and interests of shareholders by flaunting the norm of
equality. Though these newest defenses, often encapsulated in a
poison pill security, may appear superficially to treat shareholders
equally, in substance they may discriminate among shareholders by
altering voting rights, share values or the right to participate in corpo-
rate distributions.
1. Discrimination in Voting Rights: Corporate Distributions
Which Convey Different Voting Powers to Shareholders
The requirement of shareholder approval for various business
combinations, coupled with the board of directors' relatively easy ac-
cess to voting power through the corporate proxy machinery, has
popularized the alteration of shareholder voting rights in constructing
takeover defenses. One vehicle for such defenses, dependent upon
191. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 185, at §§ 72, 124 at 286-87, 382, 383.
192. See, eg., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT ANN. § 6.40 (3d ed. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
8, § 170 (1983); N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW § 510(a) (McKinney 1963).
193. See, ag., Twenty Seven Trust v. Realty Growth Investors, 533 F. Supp. 1028, 1040 (D.
Md. 1982); Alliegro v. Pan American Bank, 136 So. 2d 656, 659 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1962); Murphy
v. Country House, Inc., 349 N.W.2d 289, 293 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984); 11 W. FLETCHER,
CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5352 (rev. perm. ed. 1971); H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra note 185, § 324; Brudney, supra note 190, at 1077.
194. Alley v. Miramon, 614 F.2d 1372, 1387 (5th Cir. 1980); Kellogg v. Georgia Pacific Paper
Corp., 227 F. Supp. 719, 722 (W.D. Ark. 1964); Levy v. Billeaud, 443 So. 2d 539, 543 (La. 1983);
Cooke v. Tankersley, 199 Okla. 634, 189 P.2d 417,419 (1948). See also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 185, §§ 348, 382, 383; Brudney, supra note 190, at 1079.
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shareholder approval, has been the supermajority amendment to the
corporate charter. 19 A second, more recently developed technique,
which is keyed to shareholder voting rights, involves the alteration of
voting power within a class or series of shares by distributing rights to
selected shareholders via a dividend of poison pill stock.
Poison pill stocks can carry several types of toxin. One of the
most invidious characteristics of recent issues has been a provision
that creates discriminatory voting power among members of a class or
series of shares. 196 The goal of the board, in altering the voting power
through the poison pill distribution, is to impose, through its own uni-
lateral action, a supermajority requirement or veto power with respect
to the corporation's merger with, or acquisition by, unwanted suitors.
This tactic is exemplified by the poison pill stock at issue in
Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court.197 Asarco's board of direc-
tors utilized previous shareholder authorization for an issue of "blank
check" preferred 198 to carry out a major portion of its defensive ef-
forts. Asarco sought to issue new Series C Preferred shares as a divi-
dend to its common stockholders. One-tenth of a share of the new
preferred was to issue for every share of Asarco common stock
outstanding.199
195. See supra note 53 and infra notes 272-74. See generally Gilson, supra note 26.
196. See, eg., Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407
(S.D.N.Y. 1985). Because of the many variations in poison pill preferred securities, some generaliza-
tions are necessary. The effectuation of supermajority requirements through the vehicle of poison
pill preferred has appeared in several recent provisions, sometimes in the form of a veto power vested
in a particular class or series of securities. As noted previously, this Article posits that actions which
effect an institutionalized shift in control from the majority to the minority shareholders, or to the
board of directors, for decisions which are reserved by corporate norms to the majority are presump-
tively invalid. Though various poison pill preferred provisions may execute such an institutionalized
shift, primary discussion of this aspect of poison pills is reserved for the text accompanying notes
232-53, infra. For examples of the characteristics often incorporated into poison pill preferred, see
infra text accompanying notes 197-201 and 204-68.
197. Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
198. "Blank check" preferred is stock authorized by the shareholders, the rights and prefer-
ences of which may be determined by the board of directors at a later date. The ostensible purpose
for a board to secure authorization for "blank check" preferred stock traditionally was to give the
board flexibility in securing financing for the corporation. With the increasing use of poison pill
preferred stock, it is presumable that a proxy now seeking such authorization would be required to
disclose the potential use of such securities as a takeover deterrent. See supra text accompanying
notes 97-100. See also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 185, §§ 125, 160.
199. Each one-tenth of a share of the preferred stock was to be entitled to a quarterly dividend
of ten cents if any dividend was declared, with priority given to the preferred over any common
stock dividend. The Series C stock was also to be entitled to a $15 liquidation preference for every
one-tenth share of preferred issued. The preferred also carried with it the right to purchase one-
seventh of a share of Asarco's common stock at a cash price of 50% of the average market price for
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The Series C shares were to possess no ordinary voting rights
until any person or group became the beneficial owner of more than
twenty percent of either Asarco's common stock or its Series C Pre-
ferred. At that time, each one-tenth of a share of the preferred stock,
except the Series C holdings of the party owning more than twenty
percent, would have five votes on all matters submitted to the com-
mon stockholders. No similar voting increase, however, would inure
to the holder of the twenty percent block of stock which triggered the
increase in voting power. The unequivocal effect of this differentia-
tion among shareholders was a virtual foreclosure of any opportunity
to gain control of Asarco by hostile share acquisition.200
Although a takeover defense may not be voided merely because
of its effectiveness, the court in Asarco found the means used to carry
out this defense unlawful under New Jersey law. In addressing the
alteration in corporate structure effected by Asarco's directors in
adopting the poison pill provision, the district court appropriately fo-
cused on the discriminatory means employed by the directors to carry
out their decision to resist the takeover:
Equality of voting power among stockholders of the same class, or
at least among the same series of a class that has more than one series, is
a basic concept in corporate law. In Faunce v. Boost Co., 15 N.J. Super.
534, 83 A.2d 649 (Ch. Div. 1951) Judge (later Justice) Haneman, noted
that "The right to vote is a basic contractual right. It was an incident to
membership or of property in the stock, of which the stockholder or
member cannot be deprived without his consent." At 539.
Asarco common stock during March of 1987, the right to be exercisable between April 1 and June
30, 1987. Asarco, 611 F. Supp. at 469-72.
200. An insurgent group would have been foreclosed from any opportunity for a business com-
bination with Asarco that was not approved by Asarco's board, because the insurgents would have
had to acquire in excess of 85% of both the common and Series C preferred stock before simple
majority voting power could be obtained. There was no possibility for acquiring this much voting
power given that an affiliate of Asarco already had voting control of 18% of Asarco's common stock.
Id. at 470-71. The voting provision of the preferred stock thus would have constituted a nearly
complete and total defense to any hostile acquisition, though Asarco did permit an unrealistic means
for acquiring the corporation in accordance with the terms of the poison pill provisions.
All voting rights of the Series C stock were to be extinguished by an offer for any and all
outstanding shares of both the common and Series C stock at a "fair price." A fair price for the
common stock was to be the greater of (1) the highest price paid by the offeror in the past two years,
or (2) a price determined to be fair by a nationally recognized investment banking firm selected by
the Asarco Board. A fair price for the Series C Preferred Stock was to be the higher of (I) the
highest price paid by the offeror in the past two years, or (2) the liquidation preference of the Pre-
ferred Stock plus accrued dividends. Id. at 472. Thus, the acquisition price for the preferred stock
alone would have been unilaterally raised by the board to a minimum of $466.5 million for any
acquisitor, friendly or hostile, not receiving a percentage of the preferred as a dividend on a common
stock holding.
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The language of the New Jersey statutes clearly suggests that voting
rights may be different among different classes or series, but nowhere is it
suggested that voting rights may be different within a class or series.20 1
Assuming that a board has the authority to determine the rights
and preferences of "blank check" stock, it still cannot use this author-
ity to discriminate between shareholders within the same class. 20 2
The board must fulfill its fiduciary duties to all shareholders, which
means treating similarly situated shareholders in a like manner.
Where such disparity of treatment is effected through unilateral board
action, it is simply invalid.20 3
2. Discrimination in Value: Corporate Distributions Which
Convey Substantively Different Values to Shareholders
Another case addressing issues of discrimination in a takeover
context is Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc.204 In Minstar, a cor-
poration headed by Irwin Jacobs acquired a substantial portion of
AMF's stock. Minstar quickly undertook a tender offer for sufficient
additional shares to obtain majority control of AMF. In response,
AMF attempted to construct a time bomb sufficient to leave Minstar
201. Id. at 477. Accord Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp.
407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (applying Delaware law).
202. Cases such as Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977) (permit-
ting a sliding voting scale so that large shareholders had proportionally less voting power per share
than small shareholders), are not contrary to this conclusion. In Baker, all shareholders purchased
their shares with the voting provisions, which favored small over large shareholders, already in
place. There was no alteration of the share contract running between the corporation and its share-
holder. All purchasers of shares entered into ownership of the corporation upon an equal basis,
implicitly aware that their voting power would not increase in direct proportion to the number of the
corporation's shares held beyond a certain quantity.
If a sliding voting scale, such as was at issue in Baker, had been imposed by unilateral action of
the board, such action would be void. In this case, there would be an alteration of existing equity
interests and impairment of the voting right existing in the share contract as entered into by the
shareholder. This type of interference by the board with the contractual relationship between the
corporation and its owners is unacceptable.
203. Impairment of shareholder voting rights may affect more than simply a shareholder's
ability to participate in control or governance of the corporation. Evidence exists that stock with
limited or nonexistent voting rights is less valuable than comparable shares with full voting power.
Cf Lease, McConnell & Mikkelson, The Market Value of Control in Publicly-Traded Corporations,
I 1 J. FIN. ECON. 439 (1983); Dodd & Warner, On Corporate Governance. A Study of Proxy Contests,
11 J. FIN. ECON. 401 (1983).
204. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). For further
discussion of Minstar's acquisition of AMF see Ross, Irwin Jacobs Lands A Big One-Finally, FOR-
TUNE, July 8, 1985, at 130; Minstar's Jacobs to Sell AMF Businesses; Most of Corporate Staff Has
Been Fired, Wall St. J., Aug. 30, 1985, at 5, col. 2.
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with only "scorched earth" if it gained control over AMF.20 5 Instru-
mental in AMF's defense was the issuance, as a dividend, of non-
transferable poison pill warrants. These warrants were issued solely
to persons holding AMF stock prior to a specified date, and the war-
rants were to be of substantial value20 6 upon any change in corporate
control, because a change in corporate control would trigger the
holder's power to exercise the warrants. The warrants had a six-
month expiration date or, alternatively, they were redeemable at a
nominal cost by the board. Once the rights were triggered, however,
they were no longer redeemable, but they were still non-
transferable.207
The court found that the poison pill warrants constituted an Me-
gal form of discrimination among shareholders under New Jersey
law.20 The court in Minstar analogized the discrimination created by
AMF's rights plan to other cases involving discrimination which re-
sulted from more traditional corporate distributions:
We recognize that the Board was empowered to issue as a dividend these
rights to all common shareholders pursuant to the corporate charter.
However, the nontransferability of the rights constituted a division of the
205. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252, 1255-56 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
AMF's "scorched earth" plan amended stock option and incentive plans to eliminate performance
requirements, increased benefits for a retirement annuity plan, established golden parachutes and
made the trusts to fund these added benefits irrevocable upon a change in corporate control.
206. The rights were to become exercisable upon a 30% or greater accumulation of AMF
stock by a person not "having proposed a plan to acquire all the remaining shares on terms which
are deemed fair by the board of directors." Id. at 1256. The rights also entitled their holders to an
annual dividend of 15.5% calculated on the liquidation value of $172.50. Id. at 1257.
207. Id. at 1256. In Minstar, the court engaged in a two-tiered analysis to determine whether
to enjoin the defensive actions of AMF. First, the court held that AMFs board was within its power
in resisting Minstar's advances. Although the court questioned whether the business judgment rule
should be applied to determine the validity of a target corporation's defensive actions, it relied on
prior New Jersey cases and applied the business judgment rule to justify the initial decision by
AMF's board to resist Minstar's advances.
Once the court determined that AMFs decision to resist was justified, it then turned to the
second step in the analysis-whether the means employed by the AMF board violated either funda-
mental principles of corporate governance or the directors' fiduciary duty to the shareholders. The
court found it irrelevant that the rights were issued in the midst of a battle for corporate control.
Moreover, the court did not even consider whether AMF's defensive actions were taken pursuant to
a proper corporate purpose, nor whether AMF's directors had breached their fiduciary duties to the
shareholders. Rather, the court's decision to enjoin the defensive actions of AMF was based upon a
determination that the directors had exceeded their power in governing the corporation. Minstar
thus exemplifies an analysis focusing on the means of resistance to hostile share acquisitions, rather
than merely the decision to resist.
208. Id. at 1258. The non-transferability distinguished the rights from ordinary dividends,
ownership of which can be transferred prior to actual payment. Accord Unilever Acquisition Corp.
v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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common stock into two classes (pre-May 20, post-May 20). The bundle
of rights possessed by pre-May 20 shareholders is significantly greater
than those that would be possessed by purchasers of the common stock
on the open market, post-May 20. We consider this discriminatory
reclassification of the common stock as improper. We believe that the
Board may not do this without shareholder approval under New Jersey
Law. N.J. Stat. 14 A:9-12(e).20 9
Thus, board actions that discriminate among shareholders of a
given class, such as those involved in Asarco and Minstar, are invalid.
That the distributions in both cases were made to all shareholders on
a superficially pro rata basis does not affect this conclusion. In each
case, the distributions in the hand of the would-be corporate ac-
quisitor were of substantially lesser power or value. Such distribu-
tions are invalid based upon their discriminatory treatment of
shareholders of the same classes or series of stock.
3. Discrimination in Share Repurchases: Greenmail and
Selective Self-Tender Offers
When the directors of a target corporation become aware that an
individual, group or another corporation has begun to accumulate
shares of stock in the target, their response, if any, is essentially up to
their discretion. However, as in all other matters, these directors
must operate within the confines of the statute and the common law
norms which govern their corporation. These principles are not tem-
porarily repealed by what may be a hostile bid for corporate control.
If the corporate directors cannot discriminate among shareholders
prior to a hostile share accumulation, neither should they have the
power to discriminate after a hostile share accumulation has begun.
Provisions must be made, however, for the corporate directors to
protect the corporation from genuine threats to its well-being (as op-
posed to threats merely to incumbent control). In response to threats
to its corporate well-being, but for other purposes as well, it has come
to be accepted that a corporation may repurchase or redeem its
shares. In Delaware, site of the most controversial recent cases, there
209. The court found any such change in the voting structure of the corporation must be
approved by shareholders. The court in Minstar also expressly notes its difference with the Delaware
Supreme Court in UnocaL Minstar, 621 F. Supp. at 1258. See also Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes
A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985). Yet another ground for issuance of the injunction was the
non-transferability of the rights, which the court found constituted an "unreasonable restraint" upon
transferability of securities. Minstar, 621 F. Supp. at 1258. Accord Unilever Acquisition Corp. v.
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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is specific statutory authority for a corporation to deal in its shares. 210
Both logic and the laws which govern corporate distributions
that arise outside of takeover battles support applying the principle of
equality to corporate repurchases of stock. Consistency would re-
quire a rule that repurchases must be carried out on a pro rata basis.
The essential rationale for this treatment is that repurchases are like
other corporate distributions, particularly when they are made at a
premium over market price.211 Indeed, statutory treatment of corpo-
rate stock repurchases is very similar to the treatment afforded other
types of corporate distributions.212
There is, however, some inherent conflict between the distribu-
210. Section 160 of the Delaware Corporation Law states that "[e]very corporation may
purchase, redeem, receive, take or otherwise acquire, own and hold, sell, lend, exchange, transfer or
otherwise dispose of, pledge, use and otherwise deal in and with its own shares. . ." DEL. CODE.
ANN. tit. 8, § 160 (1983). See also N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 202(a)(14), 513 (McKinney 1963);
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 6.31 (3d ed. 1985); H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note
185, § 183, at 474.
Traditionally, there have been two means of challenging repurchases of shares by the board to
squelch insurgent threats to control. First, shareholders have often challenged the board's decision
to resist a merger or acquisition offer. With respect to these challenges, boards that have acted in
good faith have been afforded the protection of the business judgment rule. The alternate share-
holder challenge has been based upon a claim that corporate assets were being wasted in the repur-
chase of the corporation's shares at a premium price from parties hostile to management. Where the
board has been informed and has made a good faith decision, these challenges have also failed to
prevail over the presumption of legality established by the business judgment rule for such board
actions. Since the price to be paid when a corporation repurchases its shares has its primary effect
upon the value of those shares remaining outstanding, the framework discussed in the text accompa-
nying notes 139-84, supra, would support the continued evaluation of these claims of waste under the
business judgment rule. See generally Nathan & Sobel, supra note 25.
211. In re Roco Corp. 21 B.R. 429, 434 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (The purchase by a corporation
of its own stock is a form of shareholder distribution.). H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, supra note 185,
§ 335, at 936. ("[P]urchase by a corporation of its own shares. . . sometimes has an effect similar to
a dividend, and is subject to analogous legal limitations and tax consequences.") See also CBS Inc.
Accepts 6.4 Million Shares In Tender Offer, Wall St. J., Aug. 2, 1985, at 20, col. 1. (In Turner
Broadcasting's hostile attempt to take control of CBS, CBS responded with a self-tender offer. Tur-
ner Broadcasting tendered its shares because, it said, "the CBS self tender is in essence a dividend
being made available to all CBS shareholders.")
212. The Model Business Corporation Act has common provisions governing "distributions,"
which include dividends, redemptions and other share repurchases. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT
ANN. §§ 1.40(6), 6.40 (3d ed. 1985). See also Brudney, supra note 190, at 1106. That some share-
holders may benefit to different degrees in a repurchase, depending on whether or not they sell or
tender their shares to the corporation, does not change the norm that shareholders should be af-
forded a like opportunity to sell as are other similarly situated owners. While most state statutes do
not require repurchases to be made on a pro rata basis, it is clear from the cases that the distribution
of corporate assets which results from a repurchase should not result in favored treatment to any
group of shareholders, whether it be monetary advantage or maintenance of control. Petty v.
Penntech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140 (Del. Ch. 1975); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d
548 (1964); Brudney, supra note 190, at 1108. See also Bradley & Wakeman, The Wealth Effects of
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tional norm of equality and share repurchases. Unless the desire of
management is to take the corporation private, some limitation must
be placed upon the number of shares to be repurchased. More funda-
mentally, unlike the right of shareholders of the same class to be
treated alike by the corporation with respect to corporate distribu-
tions, shareholders usually hold no right to have the corporation re-
purchase their shares. The ability to sell is an incident of share
ownership; the right to sell to the corporation is not.
Still, the repurchase by the corporation of its own shares, while
not precisely a distribution as in the case of dividends or liquidation
payments, is analogous to such distributions. Repurchases by the cor-
poration thus can also give rise to possible problems of discrimination.
If the repurchase of shares is made by a publicly held corporation
whose securities are actively traded, and the repurchase is made in the
open market or made privately at market price, the conflict between
equality and the board's power to repurchase shares is of little conse-
quence. It is when a premium over market price is paid, however,
that the conflict between selective treatment and corporate norms cre-
ates difficulties.
The two primary actions which raise these issues in the current
struggles for corporate control are the payment of greenmail and the
exclusionary self-tender offer. These repurchases each involve the ap-
parent favoring of one group of shareholders over another. In the
context of other types of corporate distributions, such discriminatory
treatment would clearly be struck down as violative of the basic
norms relating to equality of treatment. Although there is usually no
right to have the corporation buy back a holder's shares, selective re-
purchases implicate the duty of management to act on behalf of all
shareholders. Thus, the favoring of one shareholder over another is
not a pure question of business policy to be protected by the business
judgment rule.
Discriminatory treatment unrelated to a fundamental share-
holder right traditionally has been subjected to judicial review pursu-
ant to a standard of intrinsic fairness. 213 Balancing the principle of
Targeted Share Repurchases, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 301 (1983); Vermaelen, Common Stock Repurchases
and Market Signalling: An Empirical Study, 9 J. FIN. ECON. 139 (1981).
213. Indeed, prior to Unocal it was apparently the generally held belief that any reacquisition
of shares by a corporation would be subject to a test of fairness. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER,
supra note 165, § 240, at 652 ("[Acquisition] by the corporation of some of its outstanding shares
which unduly favors one group of shareholders over another constitutes a breach of the directors'
fiduciary duties.").
[Vol. 47:407
HOSTILE SHARE ACQUISITIONS
equality and the directors' discretion in repurchasing shares is
achieved by requiring that the payments accomplish a purpose that is
fair to all shareholders.
a. Greenmail and Intrinsic Fairness
The payment of greenmail to a corporate raider provides a strong
test for this analysis. Reconciling such premium repurchases with
standards of shareholder equality has usually been based upon the
argument that the repurchase was for the corporation's benefit in
thwarting a hostile acquisition.214 A premise of this argument is that
the averted acquisition would have been detrimental to the corpora-
tion and that by avoiding it, the corporation and all its shareholders
have benefited. 215 Herein lies the basis for purported equality. First,
the corporate raider is treated fairly because the corporation repur-
chases his stock at a premium price, and second, to those shareholders
who do not receive a premium price for their shares, there is instead
the benefit of protection from a hostile raider who would damage the
corporation and the shareholders' investment interests. The directors
approving the purchase should have the burden of establishing these
benefits to the various groups of shareholders.216
214. See, eg., Herald Co. v. Seawell, 472 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972); Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del.
Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964). While a repurchase of shares from parties seeking control of the
target corporation may provide a benefit to target corporation shareholders where the acquiring
party is truly a "raider" seeking to loot the corporation of its assets, in general, such repurchases or
"greenmail" payments are probably detrimental to shareholders. Bradley & Wakeman, supra note
212, at 301. ("[P]rivately negotiated repurchases of single blocks from stockholders unaffiliated with
the firm reduce the wealth of non-participating stockholders. In contrast to the evidence for general
repurchases, no positive wealth effect offsets the significant repurchase premium paid to the selling
stockholder. Indeed, the wealth loss to non-participating stockholders is significantly greater than
the premium paid. This evidence is inconsistent with the shareholders' interest hypothesis and sup-
ports the hypothesis that managers in their self-interest use single block repurchases to eliminate
threats to their control over the firm's resources."); Dann & DeAngelo, Standstill Agreements, Pri-
vately Negotiated Stock Repurchases, and the Market for Corporate Control, 11 J. FIN. ECON., 275
(1983) ("Standstills and premium buybacks reduce competition for corporate control and provide
differential treatment of large block stockholders. The analysis indicates a statistically significant
negative average effect on non-participating stockholder wealth associated with standstill agree-
ments. Negotiated premium repurchases are also associated with negative, but less significant, stock-
holder returns. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that these management actions are
in the best interests of non-participating stockholders.").
215. The claim that "greenmail" actually benefits a corporation's shareholders is made in a
recent article exploring the economics of these payments. Macey & McChesney, A TheoreticalAnal-
ysis of Corporate Greenmail, 95 YALE L.J. 13 (1985).
216. See, eg., Crane Co. v. Harsco Corp., 511 F. Supp. 294, 305 (1981). In that shareholder
approval may be obtained for any repurchase of shares, it serves to insulate to some degree the
directors from claims based on discrimination. Since the purchasing of the insurgent's shares will
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b. Exclusionary Self-Tenders and Intrinsic Fairness
The Delaware Supreme Court's decision in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co. 217 focused on the propriety of the defensive actions
taken by Unocal's board of directors in fending off a hostile tender
offer by T. Boone Pickens and his Mesa Petroleum Company. The
defensive action called into question was a tender offer by Unocal's
board for approximately twenty-nine percent of Unocal's own shares
at a substantial premium over market price. Unocal sought to make
itself a less attractive acquisition by drawing down its substantial cash
accounts through its repurchase of shares. Mesa sought to participate
in this very attractive distribution of cash to Unocal shareholders by
tendering its shares, but it was excluded from the offer and denied the
same pro rata treatment afforded other Unocal shareholders. 21 8
Both the propriety of the target board's resistance to a tender
offer and the possibility for the wasting of corporate assets arose in
Unocal. However, the main issue was Mesa's exclusion from Unocal's
tender for its own shares. In its analysis under the business judgment
rule, the Delaware Supreme Court's finding that Unocal's board had
exercised its good faith judgment in resisting Mesa's tender offer was
quite correct. In analyzing the exclusion of the shares owned by Mesa
usually be accomplished prior to their obtaining a majority of the shares, or the insurgent's shares
may be denied a vote on the endorsement of the repurchase transaction, a ratification of the direc-
tors' actions through shareholder vote is persuasive evidence that shareholders have benefited on a
par with the insurgents who received a premium price for their shares.
A first step in attaining legitimacy for any defensive measure should be shareholder approval.
For many defensive measures, shareholder approval can be obtained prior to any threat to corporate
control. Golden parachutes and fair price provisions are examples of defensive measures that can be
implemented prior to an attack by corporate raiders. Thus, these measures can and should be ap-
proved by shareholders when they are implemented. That shareholder approval may be more diffi-
cult to obtain after a tender offer for the corporation's stock has been made is perhaps only fair,
given that director motives may be more suspect once an offer has been made and that shareholders
may be put on notice for the first time that their shares may carry more value than they previously
believed. For defenses based upon the selective repurchase of shares, the problem of obtaining share-
holder approval is more acute. Since it is obvious that a selective repurchase or greenmail payment
can only be made after the corporate insurgent has accumulated shares, the requirement of share-
holder approval of the repurchase would greatly limit the director's flexibility to make what may
often be a sound investment in the continued success of the corporation.
217. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
218. Besides the case discussed here, Pickens also sued Unocal in a California district court to
have Unocal's exclusionary self-tender invalidated under the federal securities laws, but to no avail.
Unocal Corp. v. Pickens, 608 F. Supp. 1081 (C.D. Cal. 1985). Had Unocal been forced to include
Mesa in the repurchase plan, Mesa would have stood to profit by as much as $178 million. See
Unocal Is Ordered To Include Pickens In Buyback Offer, Wall St. J., April 30, 1985, at 3, col. 4.
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from Unocal's self-tender offer, however, the court's rationale was
quite incorrect.
The opening sentence of the opinion states that the court is con-
fronted with "an issue of first impression in Delaware-the validity of
a corporation's self-tender for its own shares which excludes from
participation a stockholder making a hostile tender offer for the com-
pany's stock. ' 219 The court gave this issue limited attention, however,
focusing instead on the validity of Unocal's decision to resist Mesa's
tender offer and finding that, since the decision to resist was proper,
the discriminatory exclusion must be reviewed under the business
judgment rule.
The Delaware Supreme Court justified the Mesa exclusion by ref-
erence to a line of Delaware cases which involved the premium price
repurchase of shares from parties hostile to incumbent control. 220 Re-
lying on these cases, the court stated that "it is now well established
that in the acquisition of its shares a Delaware corporation may deal
selectively with its stockholders, provided the directors have not acted
out of a sole or primary purpose to entrench themselves in office. '2 21
This statement is erroneous as a matter of fact and disingenuous as a
matter of judicial analysis. The cases relied upon establish no such
proposition.
The five cases cited by the court in Mesa establish that a board's
decision to resist a tender offer is governed by the business judgment
rule. These cases also establish that if this decision is carried out
through a share repurchase, challenges to the repurchase by share-
holders claiming a wasting of corporate assets are also governed by the
business judgment rule.222 None of the cases cited by the court in
Unocal, however, addressed the propriety of unilateral action by the
board to repurchase shares on a discriminatory basis.223 Although
219. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949.
220. Id. at 954 (citing Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964)); Kaplan v.
Goldsamt, 380 A.2d 556, 568-569 (Del. Ch. 1977); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405,
408 (1962); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 47, 158 A.2d 136, 140-41 (1960); Martin v. American Potash
& Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295, 302 (1952)).
221. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954.
222. If the repurchases made in the five cases cited by the court had all been made on the open
market, or even if the repurchases had been privately negotiated at market price, a lawsuit would
probably not even have been bought. The issues in these cases are the board's power to resist a
hostile overture and corporate waste resulting from an allegedly excessive premium payment.
223. Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (1952), in-
cluded a claim by a shareholder that under a prior Delaware statute, § 28 of the General Corpora-
tion Law, Rev. Code, § 2060 (1935), a corporation could not reduce its capital by repurchasing
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the Delaware Supreme Court is correct in asserting that these cases
involve situations where a corporation dealt selectively with its share-
holders, it is wrong when it states that any of these cases decided a
challenge to the propriety of the type of discriminatory treatment in-
volved in Unocal.224 Contrary to the court's representation, no au-
thority existed in Delaware, prior to Unocal, for the proposition that
the business judgment rule governs a challenge to the discriminatory
repurchase of a corporation's shares effected for a deliberately dis-
criminatory purpose.225
In Unocal, the Delaware Chancery Court, in granting Mesa a
shares without doing so on a pro rata basis. The court in Martin held that a corporation could
repurchase shares from a dissentient faction, without making a similar offer to all shareholders, upon
the affirmative vote of the shareholders. Indeed, under the statute at issue in Martin, shareholder
approval was required to reduce the corporation's capitalization through any retirement of shares.
Id. at 299. The safeguard of shareholder approval in a "greenmail" case is precisely what is advo-
cated herein when it is feasibly obtainable. When the exigencies do not permit the corporation to
obtain shareholder approval, the courts are urged then to verify that there is no unfairness in the
repurchase. The court in Martin stated that:
We see no sound reason why it should be held as a matter of law that the method of
reducing capital by purchasing shares at private sale for retirement may not be invoked
simply because the purpose or motive of the reduction is to eliminate a substantial number
of shares held by a stockholder at odds with management policy, provided of course that
the transaction is clear of any fraud or unfairness.
Id. at 302 (emphasis added). Insofar as the court in Martin made these determinations, this Article
totally agrees with the case, the corporation having gained shareholder approval for its actions and
no unfairness being found.
224. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964), involved a shareholders' deriva-
tive suit to hold directors of the target company "liable for loss allegedly resulting from improper use
of corporate funds to purchase shares of the company." Id. at 549-50 (emphasis added). Bennett v.
Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962), was a suit for an accounting alleging waste and im-
proper use of corporate funds in repurchasing shares. Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp.,
33 Del. Ch. 234, 92 A.2d 295 (1952) is discussed at note 223, supra. Kaplan v. Goldsamt, 380 A.2d
556 (Del. Ch. 1977), was a derivative suit charging defendant directors with issuance of false and
misleading proxy statements and "waste of corporate assets." Id. at 558 (emphasis added). Kors v.
Carey, 39 Del. Ch. 39, 158 A.2d 136 (1960), similarly involved a claim that directors had improperly
used and wasted corporate funds in repurchasing stock and had paid an excessive price in purchasing
the assets of another business. Id. at 137-38. The particular pages cited indicate that "directors,
while bound to deal with stockholders as a class with scrupulous honesty, may in the exercise of
their honest business judgment adopt a valid method of eliminating what appears to them a clear
threat to the future of their business by any lawful means." Kors, 158 A.2d at 141 (citing McPhail v.
L.S. Starrett Co., 257 F.2d 388 (1st Cir. 1958)). As a statement of the law governing a board's
decision whether to resist a hostile offer, this language is unassailable. But as a guide to evaluating
the permissibility of a particular means of resistance, it begs the question. Whether the means em-
ployed are lawful is precisely the issue for determination. None of these cases approved of selective
dealings with shareholders in the nature of the action taken by Unocal's board.
225. Court to Decide Today Whether Unocal May Bar Mesa Group's Tender of Shares, Wall St.
J., April 29, 1985, at 2, col. 3 ("ITihe company [Unocal] has said it isn't able to cite a legal precedent
for its exclusion.").
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temporary restraining order, had recognized that directors could not
discriminate among their shareholders.22 6 The chancery court found
only one case, Fisher v. Moltz,2 27 which had dealt with a challenge to
the discriminatory repurchase of shares. 228 The Fisher decision sim-
ply recognized that statutory authority existed for a Delaware corpo-
ration to repurchase its shares.229 In Fisher, the court ruled that a
prerequisite to any share repurchase is a proper corporate purpose for
the repurchase. The chancery court in Mesa also began its inquiry
with whether a proper corporate purpose might exist for a corpora-
tion's self-tender offer. But section 160 of the Delaware Corporations
Code involves the right to repurchase, not the right to discriminate.
Thus, the chancery court in Mesa addressed the legality of discrimi-
nating among shareholders from a perspective of fairness in the
board's governing of the corporation.
The chancery court held that a proper corporate purpose, by it-
self, was insufficient to justify a selective tender offer. Unocal must
also demonstrate the fairness of its tender offer to all shareholders,
and this the chancery court deemed most unlikely. In stating its hold-
ing, the chancery court noted that "legally or equitably impermissible
conduct cannot be justified by the fact that it was motivated by a
proper corporate purpose. 2 30 Unfortunately, the Delaware Supreme
Court did not reach this level of analysis. Instead, the supreme court
determined that since Unocal's initial decision to resist the Mesa offer
was justified by the business judgment rule, the means employed by
Unocal to resist Mesa's offer would also be reviewed under the busi-
ness judgment rule.
With equality as a general guide to corporate distributions, and
corporate stock repurchases constrained both by the need to demon-
strate a proper corporate purpose and fair treatment to all sharehold-
ers, the path that should have been taken by the Delaware Supreme
Court in Unocal becomes clear. The first step is to determine whether
the board exercised informed, good faith judgment in determining
that Mesa's tender offer was inadequate. Upon doing so, the board's
226. Mesa Petroleum Co. v. Unocal Corp., No. 7997, slip op. (Del. Ch. April 29, 1985), rev'd,
493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
227. No. 6068, slip op. (Del. Ch. Dec. 28, 1979), reprinted in 5 DEL. J. CORP. L. 530 (1980).
228. The chancery court also noted both Mesa's and Unocal's concurrence that Fisher "states
the legal principles governing a company's selective purchase of its stock." Mesa Petroleum Co. v.
Unocal Corp., No. 7997, slip op. at 3 (Del. Ch. April 29, 1985), rev'd, 493 A.3d 946 (Del. 1985).
229. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 160(a) (1983).
230. Mesa Petroleum, slip op. at 7.
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power to resist this offer properly was established. The court should
then have examined the means employed by Unocal in resisting
Mesa's offer. This the supreme court did only superficially, for had
the court made a thorough analysis of the specific defense involved, it
would have invalidated the exclusionary self-tender offer made by
Unocal.
Both greenmail and exclusionary self-tender offers require analy-
sis under an intrinsic fairness standard. In contrast to selective repur-
chases from corporate insurgents, however, an exclusionary self-
tender by a corporation cannot be justified by the protection it affords
to those against whom it discriminates. The exclusion of the raider's
shares from the tender offer cannot be justified as intrinsically fair to
all stockholders. The premium payments are to be made to all share-
holders except the insurgent, and the supposed benefit afforded by the
self-tender is also to be conferred upon all shareholders save the insur-
gents. It is obvious there can be no intrinsic fairness in the target
board's treatment of its unwanted suitor as compared with its other
shareholders. Plainly, the selective self-tender is, in almost all imagi-
nable cases, illegal as an unfair form of discrimination among
shareholders.
Both greenmail and exclusionary self-tenders have come under
attack as wasteful or abusive defensive actions. 231 In its Unocal deci-
sion, the Delaware Supreme Court fumbled its opportunity to deal
with both of these discriminatory, and often abusive, defensive tactics
when it failed to establish consistent principles for analyzing these re-
sponses to hostile share acquisitions. In both greenmail and exclu-
sionary self-tender offer cases, affirmation of the fundamental norms
of equality in corporate governance and equality in shareholder rights
is a sufficient basis for overturning defensive actions which are not
justified under a standard of intrinsic fairness, without impairing the
basic premise of the business judgment rule.
C. Defensive Techniques and the Separation of Powers
in the Corporation
Thus far, this Article has analyzed several antitakeover tactics,
231. See supra note 19, discussing proposed federal legislation. The SEC is also currently con-
sidering proposing new rules that would prohibit a company from making selective tender offers for
its own shares. The rule would be designed to eliminate exclusionary self-tender offers like that
made by Unocal Corporation in its conflict with Mesa Petroleum Company. Proposed SEC Rule on
Tender Offers By Issuers, 17 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 1310 (July 12, 1985).
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such as nonredeemable poison pills and exclusionary self-tenders, and
has found that they either violate traditional corporate norms or the
fiduciary obligations of the board. In this section, the Article exam-
ines measures which protect incumbent management by shifting the
ability to make or approve changes in control from the shareholders
to the board. If management approval is required for corporate con-
trol to shift, no change in control may take place unless incumbent
management is compensated.
Even where the board takes action which affects all shareholders
in a similar manner, it is not immune from attack. Fiduciary duties
still constrain the board's activities. As discussed in part IV, section
A, even otherwise traditional business decisions must not be so ex-
treme as to either effectively cripple the corporation or else result in
an abdication of the discretion delegated to the board to act as the
management organ of the corporate entity.
Admittedly, where the board acts pursuant to traditional author-
ity and takes actions which affect all shareholders in a like manner,
restrictions on judicial review of these activities are justifiably sub-
stantial. Given the limits of the board's role, it must have substantial
freedom within those limits to act on behalf of the corporation. The
enabling character of the typical state corporation statute and the
business judgment rule provides this necessary cushion.2 3 2
Some of the most recent antitakeover measures, however, do not
treat shareholders in an unequal manner and otherwise appear to be
within the board's statutory power. As exemplified by Moran v.
Household International, Inc. ,233 redeemable preferred stock rights
which make a hostile share acquisition or merger prohibitively expen-
sive have become popular.234 Board-imposed contingent
supermajority provisions or designated shareholder veto powers have
also been attempted.235 These provisions initially may be justified by
statutory or charter provisions which enable the board to determine
the rights and preferences of authorized but unissued stock.236
232. See generally Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARV. L. REV.
1276, 1312-34 (1984).
233. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
234. See, eg., Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985); National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell
Co., No. 7278, slip op. (Del. Ch. Aug. 25, 1983).
235. Minstar Acquiring Corp. v. AMF Inc., 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Telvest, Inc.
v. Olson, No. 5798, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 8, 1979).
236. For example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 151(g) (1983) provides in pertinent part:
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But the board, even when its actions affect all shareholders simi-
larly, is not limited solely by the requirements that it not waste the
corporation's assets or completely abdicate its role as corporate over-
seer. The opposite of abdication of power is usurpation of power.
While the board must exercise its discretion to protect the sharehold-
ers and enhance the corporation, it must also act within the scope of
its authority.
It has been stated that "corporate law is constitutional law" 23 7
and actions by the board which alter the traditional separation of
powers within the corporation violate the corporate constitution.
When this alteration shifts control from the shareholders to the
board, for matters committed by statute or principle to the former,
the board usurps the shareholders' functions and rights. It is in this
respect that some recent antitakeover devices, such as "redeemable"
stock warrants or rights and "contingent" supermajorities may be
invalid.2 38
One fairly common aspect of poison pill stock distributions is a
"flip-over" provision which grants a right of redemption or converti-
bility at an extremely favorable price or ratio.2 39 The purpose and
effect of such a provision is to make specific transactions, either a sub-
When any corporation desires to issue any shares of stock of any class or of any series of
any class of which the voting powers, designations, preferences and relative, participating,
optional or other rights, if any, or the qualifications, limitations or restrictions thereof, if
any, shall not have been set forth in the certificate of incorporation or in any amendment
thereto but shall be provided for in a resolution or resolutions adopted by the board of
directors pursuant to authority expressly vested in it by the provisions of the certificate of
incorporation or any amendment thereto, a certificate setting forth a copy of such resolu-
tion or resolutions and the number of shares of stock of such class or series shall be exe-
cuted, acknowledged, filed, recorded, and shall become effective, in accordance with § 103
of this title. . . . When any certificate filed under this subsection becomes effective, it shall
have the effect of amending the certificate of incorporation.
237. M. EISENBERG, supra note 135, at 1.
238. The focus in this section is on the shift in control from the shareholders to the board
caused by these devices. These provisions may have other effects which make them subject to chal-
lenge. The redeemable poison pill, for example, once triggered, divests the board of all power to act,
resulting in an abdication of managerial obligations. See supra text accompanying notes 168-84.
The board-created supermajority, contingency aspect aside, shifts control among the shareholders.
See infra text accompanying notes 254-86.
239. See, e.g., Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Goldsmith, 609 F. Supp. 187, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)
("The rights entitled holders to purchase shares of stock at a highly deflated price."); Horwitz v.
Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (D. Nev. 1985) ("In the case of a merger,
each warrant entitles its holder to receive stock of the surviving company having a market value of
$100 in return for the payment of $50."); Asarco Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468,
471 (D.N.J. 1985) (The Series C stock had the right to purchase Asarco's common stock at 50% of
its market price). See generally Finkelstein, supra note 52, at 299-301.
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stantial share acquisition or a merger, prohibitively expensive. 24° As
discussed earlier, to the extent that such a feature results in preemp-
tion of all possible mergers, its adoption is a breach of fiduciary duty
by the board of directors.241
Rarely, however, is such a provision included without reserving
for the board the power to defuse it. The board typically either has
the right to redeem the preferences or warrants for a nominal price,242
or else the poison pill provisions are not operative if the transaction is
approved by a specified percentage of the board.2 43 One set of rules
applies if the transaction is approved by incumbent management,
otherwise, another set of rules apply. Moreover, the cost of pro-
ceeding without board approval makes the latter option unfeasible. In
essence, then, any person desiring to undertake any transaction identi-
fied in the terms of the poison pill must first negotiate with the board.
It is not disputed that, under many statutes, the board of direc-
tors initially evaluates many issues that ultimately require shareholder
action, such as mergers or charter amendments. 244 Indeed, if direc-
tor-adopted poison pill provisions did nothing more than confirm
these existing prerogatives, their effect on the separation of corporate
powers would not be an issue. But their potency as antitakeover de-
vices is measured by the breadth of the transactions to which they
apply, because most poison pill provisions are designed to deter any
significant hostile share acquisition, whether or not it would ulti-
mately result in a merger.
240. See, eg., Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1132-33 (D. Nev.
1985) ("In either event, the cost would be so high as to make any merger unfeasible."). If these
provisions allowed shareholders to purchase the target corporation's shares at such a discount, the
directors would likely be liable for waste of corporate assets. These provisions, however, allow
purchase of the raider's shares at this rate. See supra note 121.
241. See supra text accompanying notes 168-84. Another common feature of these poison pills
is the requirement of supermajority approval for fundamental changes or other identified transac-
tions. Such provisions disturb the norm of majority rule and may be invalid on this basis. See infra
text accompanying notes 258-71. To the extent that such a requirement is contingent on board
approval, the analysis in this section would invalidate it. For an example of such a rare occurrence,
see Asarco v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468 (D.N.J. 1985).
242. See, eg., Horwitz v. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc., 604 F. Supp. 1130, 1132 (D. Nev.
1985) ("The Company may recall or redeem the warrants for the nominal price of 25c each.");
Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Goldsmith, 609 F. Supp. 187, 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("Crown's Board of
Directors retained the power to redeem the rights for fifty cents each."); Minstar Acquiring Corp. v.
AMF Inc. 621 F. Supp. 1252 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) ("The Rights are redeemable for $.10 per Right by
action of the AMF board.").
243. See, eg., Telvest, Inc. v. Olson, No. 5798, slip op. (Del. Ch. March 8, 1979)
(supermajority voting requirements not applicable if transaction approved by two-thirds of board).
244. See, eg., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 242, 251 (1983) (amendment of charter and merger).
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The contingent nature of the rights and obligations created by
these provisions is the key to their invalidity. Their purpose is to ex-
pand the scope of transactions for which management approval is re-
quired. Their effect is to redistribute rights properly residing with the
shareholders-such as voting on a merger or selling shares pursuant
to a tender offer-to the board. These provisions directly restrict the
rights of shareholders as a group to vote on fundamental corporate
changes, and they indirectly impinge on the rights of shareholders as
individuals to dispose of their shares. In sum, these devices seek to
reach beyond the boardroom to preempt actions at the annual share-
holders' meeting and to chill transactions between private individuals
in the marketplace. As succinctly stated by one court, "[i]n the pres-
ent case the defensive device. . . is calculated to alter the structure of
the corporation, removing decisions in takeover matters from individ-
ual stockholders and reposing them in the Board. ' '245
An effective contingent poison pill, such as that adopted in Mo-
ran v. Household International Inc.,246 has the same effect as a lock-
up option 247-it deters future bids by potential suitors. When a lock-
up option is granted to a third party in the context of active multiple-
party bidding for the target corporation, bidding stops and the third
party effectively controls the target's future. Target shareholders are
deprived of the benefit of the auction. As the Delaware Supreme
Court recently held in Revlon v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings
Inc. ,248 a board which grants a lock-up option under these circum-
stances may breach its fiduciary duty to the corporation and its
shareholders.
A contingent poison pill similarly prevents overtures by potential
bidders. The difference between a lock-up option and a contingent
poison pill is that with the poison pill, it is the target's board of direc-
tors, not a third party, that holds the option which prevents hostile
suitors from seeking control. Since any attempt to merge or consoli-
date with the target while the poison pill is in place is tantamount to
financial suicide, negotiation with the target's board becomes an effec-
tive prerequisite to obtaining control.
Although the board of directors of a corporation is empowered
to act on behalf of the company's shareholders to manage the corpo-
245. Asarco, Inc. v. M.R.H. Holmes A Court, 611 F. Supp. 468, 474 (D.N.J. 1985).
246. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
247. See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
248. [Current] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 92,357 (Del. Nov. 1, 1985).
[Vol. 47:407
HOSTILE SHARE ACQUISITIONS
ration, the courts have not viewed favorably attempts by the board to
alter the fundamental structure of the corporation. 249 Where such ac-
tions affect the corporate control apparatus or the right of majority
shareholder power, the scrutiny is particularly intense.250 Both by
voting on fundamental changes in the corporate structure and by sell-
ing their shares, the shareholders are exercising rights inherent in the
owners of a business enterprise. Thus, action by a corporate board is
invalid if it directly and unilaterally alters the corporate structure as it
concerns the separation of these functions between the shareholders
and the board.
There is no doubt that the shareholders could, by affirmative ma-
jority vote, abdicate their right to tender their shares to any suitor
who did not obtain board approval.251 The contingent poison pill,
however, allows the target board to reach "the plateau of plenary ne-
gotiating authority" 252 without shareholder approval. This unilateral
usurpation of shareholder discretion alters the basic structure of the
corporation. Thus, the poison pill in Moran, like the lock-up option
in Revlon, should have been condemned.
Accepting that the board cannot unilaterally effect such a shift in
control, a significant question remains. Can the shareholders, as a
group, act to divest themselves of the prerogatives provided by statute
and common law norms? This issue arises in connection with charter
249. See, eg., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Conoco, Inc., 519 F. Supp. 506, 514 (D. Del.
1981); Holly Sugar Corp. v. Buchsbaum, [1981-1982 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
98,366, at 92,240 (D. Colo. 1981). But see Treco, Inc. v. Land of Lincoln Savings & Loan, 572 F.
Supp. 1455, 1460 (N.D. Ill. 1983) (directors' amending of bylaws to increase percentage of share-
holder vote required to amend bylaws sustained on basis of the business judgment rule). See also
Plaza See. Co. v. O'Kelley, No. 7932, slip op. (Del. Ch. Mar. 5, 1985) (corporation enjoined from
enforcing bylaw imposing waiting period and review process in the event of any attempt to take
action on corporation's behalf by written shareholder consent; the bylaw was adopted in direct re-
sponse to the announcement by a shareholder, who was seeking to acquire control of the corpora-
tion, of his intention to solicit consents for the purpose of removing the corporation's directors and
replacing them with his own nominees, and conflicted, the court found, with a statutory provision
giving shareholders the right to take immediate action by written consent unless otherwise provided
in the certificate of incorporation).
250. See, eg., Datapoint Corp. v. Plaza Sec. Co., 496 A.2d 1031, 1032-33 (Del. 1985) (bylaw
limiting "the taking of corporate action by written shareholder consent in lieu of a stockholders'
meeting" violates statute); Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 357, 230 A.2d 769
(1967). See generally Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern Cor-
porate Decisionmaking, 57 CAL. L. REv. 1 (1969).
251. See infra text accompanying notes 254-86.
252. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. v. Revlon, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
92,333, at 92,220 (Del. Ch. Oct. 23, 1985), aff'd, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 92,357 (Del.
Nov. 1, 1985).
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amendments, such as a fair price provision, which give the board the
discretion to waive certain shareholder rights.2 53 The validity of such
an amendment depends upon the nature of majority shareholder con-
trol as an integral aspect of the nature of the modem American corpo-
ration, a subject addressed in the next section in connection with the
validity of supermajority provisions.
D. The Allocation of Corporate Control Among Shareholders
An issue which parallels the allocation of corporate control be-
tween the board and shareholders is the allocation of control among
shareholders. The allocation of control among shareholders may be
determined in one of two ways. First, control may be reallocated
through supermajority provisions approved by the shareholders. Al-
ternatively, it may be reallocated through an issuance of preferred
stock, if the voting rights of the preferred, as determined by the board
of directors, include a requirement that a supermajority of the issued
class approve the consummation of a merger or similar extraordinary
transaction. Both of these alternatives raise issues concerning the role
of majority control in the modem corporate enterprise.
L The Norm of Majority Rule in the Allocation
of Corporate Control
The shareholder voting provisions in early corporation statutes,
and the cases arising thereunder, were based on the principle of pro-
tection for minority shareholders.254 Many corporations operated as
little more than formally incorporated partnerships that required the
affirmative approval of all owners to take corporate action. This ori-
entation typically was reflected in early statutes by provisions gov-
erning shareholder action that often required unanimity or, at a
minimum, two-thirds shareholder approval.255
As the ownership of corporations became more widely dispersed,
statutes requiring unanimity or near unanimous agreement among
shareholders became impractical and unwieldy. A requirement of
unanimity nearly guaranteed the inability of the corporation to act,
and even management control over proxy machinery did not make
253. See generally Finklestein, supra note 52, at 297.
254. See, eg., Verner v. Atchison, T. & S.F.R.R. Co., 28 F. Supp. 581, 587 (D. Kan. 1886);
Zabriskie v. Hackensack & New York R.R. Co., 18 N.J. Eq. 178, 183 (1878).
255. See generally II W. FLETCHER, supra note 193, at § 5769.
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lesser percentage requirements for approval necessarily practicable. 25 6
To facilitate the evolution of the corporation as a vehicle for large-
scale industrial development, new corporation statutes were passed
which gradually reduced the percentage of shareholder approval re-
quired for actions which concerned fundamental changes or ex-
traordinary transactions. This trend towards lesser percentage
approval requirements for shareholder action has culminated in the
adoption, by almost all states, of statutes requiring only a simple ma-
jority vote. 257
Taking majority rule as the standard from which to analyze the
adoption of "shark repellents" and other defenses, this Article con-
cludes that when the board unilaterally adopts provisions which alter
shareholder voting power or other elements of corporate structure,
such action is invalid. Nonetheless, provisions similar, if not identical
in effect, may, however, validly be adopted by a majority of the share-
holders.2 58 In reaching this second determination, one must remain
sympathetic to the interests of the minority shareholders, and recog-
nize the limiting effect that structural changes resulting from antitake-
over actions may have upon minority rights, particularly voting
rights. 259
2. Board Created Reallocation of Control Among Shareholders
Reallocation of corporate control among shareholders by unilat-
eral action of the board of directors is a relatively recent phenomenon.
In contrast to the normal means of reallocating control, namely,
supermajority provisions adopted by charter amendment, corporate
boards have been achieving similar results through the issuance of
preferred stock pursuant to prior blank check authorization of the
shareholders. This type of reallocation of control is effected by at-
256. See generally D. MUELLER, PUBLIC CHOICE 19-27 (1979); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra
note 34, at 728 n.10.
257. See, ag., CAL. CORP. CODE § 602(a) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 216(2)
(1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.437 (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-11(1) (West 1969);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 614(b) (McKinney 1963).
258. This assumes that the corporation statute of the relevant jurisdiction requires only a ma-
jority vote for amending the charter and other similar extraordinary corporate actions, and that the
corporation's shareholders have not acted previously to effect such an amendment which would
increase the percentage vote required.
259. For this reason, this Article advocates an interpretation of the right to dissent and de-
mand appraisal embodied in the major corporation statutes that would be activated by supermajority
limitations upon voting rights or other fundamental changes in corporate structure as adopted by a
shareholder majority. See infra text accompanying notes 285-86.
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taching to the preferred stock a requirement that a supermajority of
the class approve any modification of the preferred's rights or any
business combination. In this way the board seeks to bypass the nor-
mal need for shareholder approval of the supermajority provision.
Such unilateral board action to either alter corporate structure or
make other fundamental changes is invalid.26° Voting power reserved
for the shareholders cannot be terminated without, at the minimum,
majority consent. 261 Unilateral board action in contravention of the
norm of majority control is not supported by statute or case law.
Even the rather broad, enabling-type language which allows amend-
ment of the charter for greater-than-majority voting requirements is
no help to corporate boards seeking these changes, since such lan-
guage also requires shareholder approval.262
The earliest case which analyzed board-created supermajority
provisions is Telvest, Inc. v. Olson.263 In Telvest, the board of Outdoor
Sports Industries, Inc. (OSI) sought to fend off Telvest's aggressive
overtures by issuing a class of preferred stock which contained voting
and conversion provisions designed to thwart any proposed business
combination. The board of OSI attempted to vest a supermajority
voting approval requirement 264 in the preferred stock which would
squelch simple majority approval of designated transactions by the
common shareholders.265 A suitor not obtaining approval of the
260. Where a corporation does an act in the ordinary course of its business, through its board
of directors or other officers, the consent of all or a part of the stockholders is not necessary unless
required by statute or charter. But there are certain acts, mostly outside the ordinary business of the
corporation, as to which the board of directors cannot act, either by the common law or because of a
statute or charter provision, without the consent of all or a majority or a certain percent of the stock.
11 W. FLETCHER, supra note 193, at § 5769.
261. Faunce v. Boost Co., 15 N.J. Super. 534, 83 A.2d 649, 652 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1951).
262. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(4) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.437 (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-12(l)
(West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616(a)(2) (McKinney 1963); MODEL BUsiNESs CORP. ACT
ANN. § 7.27 (3d ed. 1985).
263. No. 5798, slip op. (Del. Ch. March 8, 1979).
264. "The voting rights created by this so-called preferred stock provide for a supermajority
vote of 80 percent in order to approve any business combination or transaction with any party who,
at the time, is the owner of 20 percent or more of the outstanding voting stock of OSI." Id. The
voting rights of the preferred were to also include a requirement that any approval include at least
50% concurrence of the outstanding shares of the preferred held by shareholders other than the
holder of the 20% stake.
265. This supermajority voting provision was to be accomplished without shareholder ap-
proval through the issuance of previously authorized blank check preferred stock incorporating the
supermajority voting rights. The court summarized the proposed alteration of voting power as
follows:
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board, 266 or not making an offer which conformed to the exempting
provisions of the preferred stock, 267 would thus have triggered a shift
in control among the shareholders.
While the charter of OSI provided for the possible issuance of
preferred stock, the rights and preferences to be determined by the
board at a later date, the question in this case was not the board's
authority to issue stock. Rather, the question concerned the board's
authority to include a supermajority provision as one of the incidents
of that issuance, because such action seemingly conflicted with the
statutory provision which allowed amendment of the corporate char-
ter only by majority shareholder approval. Applicable standards of
corporate governance, including the norm of majority rule and the
voting rights contained in the stock of the corporation's owners, man-
date the approval of a majority of the shareholders. Unilateral action
by the board in violation of such requirements should be deemed per
se invalid. The court in Telvest explicitly adhered to this rationale in
granting Telvest a preliminary injunction:
It seems more logical to conclude that where the holders of the common
stock are given the right to approve certain transactions by only the ma-
jority vote required by the various applicable statutes, that right cannot
be changed short of an amendment to the certificate of incorporation ap-
proved by the stockholders. . . . I am aware of no policy evident in the
Delaware Corporation Law, and I have been referred to none, which
would empower a board of directors to alter existing voting rights of
shareholders for the supposed good of the shareholders without permit-
ting the shareholders to be heard on the matter.2 68
[T]hrough the declaration of a purported stock dividend, os0's board has attempted to
convert the voting rights of those same stockholders who would have had the power to
approve or disapprove certain business combinations by majority vote-i.e., the holders of
the common stock-into the power, in certain situations, to permit less than a majority of
the present common stockholders to vote down a merger, sale of assets, etc. when it is
being proposed by the owner of 20 percent or more of the outstanding common stock.
Id.
266. The voting rights of the preferred stock were not to have come into being if the OSI
board, by two-thirds vote, had approved the acquisition of shares which would bring the purchasers'
total above 20%, or if similar approval had been given to a proposed business combination prior to
the stock acquisition. Id.
267. The voting rights would not have been triggered by an offer for all OSI's outstanding
voting stock that had resulted in the transfer of at least 75% of such stock not held by the tendering
party. Id.
268. The later case of National Educ. Corp. v. Bell & Howell Co., No. 7278, slip op. (Del. Ch.
Aug. 25, 1983), involved, among other things, a similar supermajority provision effected through a
dividend of preferred stock. The defendant, Bell & Howell, contended that Telvest effectively was
overruled by action of the Delaware General Assembly, but the court did not reach an interpretation
of this legislative action. Instead, the court stated its belief that Telvest was correct on its facts, and
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A similar interpretation can be made of the poison pill preferred
at issue in Asarco.269 Though the court invalidated the poison pill
issued by Asarco's board because it created discriminatory voting
rights among shareholders of the same class, the goal of the board in
creating these securities was to shift control from a simple majority of
shareholders to those shareholders not holding a twenty percent stake
in Asarco.270 Thus the discrimination among shareholders was
merely the means for implementing a plan to shift control of the cor-
poration from one group of shareholders to another, without first
gaining shareholder approval. Although the court based its decision
only on the invalidity of the discriminatory voting rights created
within a single class of stock (the discriminatory means) the end
sought to be achieved (structural change without shareholder ap-
proval) was also sufficient grounds for invalidating the actions of
Asarco's board.
Likewise, the court in Minstar271 found it impermissible that the
AMF poison pill securities had shifted control among the sharehold-
ers. Though the primary shift in control occurred as the result of an
increase in the power of the AMF board over the acceptance or rejec-
tion of tender offers, the triggering of the rights contained in the
poisoned securities would have made the rights irredeemable and re-
moved the effective veto power from the board. Instead, the veto
power would then be vested in the nontendering shareholders holding
their stock on the declaration date for the rights dividend. This result
would have occurred since only shareholders of AMF on the declara-
tion date were to receive the rights dividend and such dividend was
nontransferable, thus necessarily preventing its voting rights from be-
ing conveyed to Minstar with any tendered common stock. The dis-
trict court found this alteration in voting structure, absent
shareholder approval, impermissible under New Jersey law.
These attempts at unilateral board amendments to the corporate
charter are beyond the spirit of the enabling provisions of the corpo-
rate statutes, because the enabling provisions require that shareholder
then proceeded to attempt to distinguish the two cases. While the distinctions made between the two
cases may be valid, the logic of Telvest should have controlled in both, notwithstanding Delaware's
doctrine of "independent legal significance."
269. See supra text accompanying notes 197-201 discussing the provisions of the poison pill in
Asarco in connection with analysis of the discrimination among shareholders.
270. This was after reposing primary control in the board itself through its power of redemp-
tion. See supra note 241 discussing this shift in corporate control from shareholders to the board.
271. See supra text accompany notes 204-09, discussing the factual setting of Minstar.
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approval be obtained for modification of the norm of majority control.
A different question is posed, however, once majority shareholder ap-
proval is obtained. Consistent application of the principles of corpo-
rate democracy seems to mandate validation of control shifts resulting
from majority approved greater-than-majority voting requirements or
other antitakeover actions.
3. Shareholder Approved Reallocation of Corporate Control
If the norm of majority rule is to be maintained, the enabling
language of statutes which permit greater-than-majority voting re-
quirements must be respected. Thus, the panoply of shark repellent
charter amendments adopted by shareholders, including super-
majority provisions, must be upheld absent other cause for invalida-
tion. And while this issue is still subject to considerable controversy
among the commentators, 272 the only two cases to specifically con-
sider the adoption of supermajority provisions by shareholders, Sei-
bert v. Gulton Industries, Inc.273 and Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co.,274
both upheld the supermajority provisions adopted by a simple
majority.
The two cases are virtually identical-the only major difference
is that the first arose under Delaware law while the latter arose under
Massachusetts law. The plaintiffs' primary contention in these cases
was that a supermajority voting provision, approved by a majority of
the shareholders, violated the respective state corporation statutes be-
cause the provision was contingent on board approval of the matter.
In each case, simple majority shareholder approval was required for
business combinations having previously met with board approval.
For those proposed business combinations not having the board's
sanction, however, a supermajority approval of eighty percent in
Gulton Industries, and seventy-five percent in Milton Bradley, was re-
quired. Thus, the ability of the majority of shareholders to shift
power from the holders to the board (the issue left open in the previ-
ous section) was presented in these cases.
The plaintiffs contended that this contingency impermissibly cre-
272. See articles cited supra notes 46, 57-59. For a discussion of the effect of shareholder
adopted antitakeover amendments on shareholder wealth, see Jarrell, Ryngaert & Poulsen, Shark
Repellents: The Role and Impact ofAntitakeover Charter Amendments, [1984-1985 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 83,714 (Sept. 7, 1984).
273. No. 5631, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979), reprinted in 5 DEL. J. CORP. LAW 514 (1980),
summarily affid, 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980).
274. 405 N.E.2d 131 (Mass. 1980).
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ated two voting standards for a corporate action, where a single fixed
requirement was necessary. Both courts disagreed, however, with this
contention. In Gulton Industries, the court premised its decision on
the broad language of the Delaware corporation statute, finding that
the shifting vote requirement did not violate any provision of the stat-
ute or any public policy.275 Citing Gulton Industries, the court in
Milton Bradley found its statutory provisions analogous and reached a
similar conclusion. 276 In addition, the court in Milton Bradley held
that the board's discretion to effect a shift in the voting requirement
did not amend or modify the bylaw change granting the super-
majority for mergers.2 77 Thus, majority-approved shifts in control
from the shareholders to the board were upheld. Moreover, even
though each court addressed the validity of shareholder adopted
supermajority provisions only by implication, it is clear in these cases
that not only both courts, but also all the parties involved in the ac-
tions, readily accepted the legality of the amendments, absent the con-
tingencies, as proper.278
These cases are instructive on the strength of the modem man-
date of majority shareholder power, both to shift control among the
shareholders and to shift control from the holders to the board.
While supermajority provisions which are contingent upon board ap-
proval are not explicitly provided for by statute, statutory authority
does exist for straight supermajority provisions.2 79
Some commentators have attempted to minimize the importance
of such provisions by examining their historical origins and conclud-
ing that their alteration of the standard of majority control was a leg-
islative response to the needs of the close corporation.280 This
position, however, does not deal with the lack of legislative limitation
on the use of supermajority provisions in publicly held corporations.
Moreover, given the vastly increased use of supermajority provisions
and the absence of any limitations imposed upon their use by state
275. Seibert v. Gulton Indus., Inc., No. 5631, slip op. (Del. Ch. June 21, 1979), reprinted in 5
DEL. J. CORP. 514, 518 (1980), summarily afid, 414 A.2d 822 (Del. 1980).
276. Seibert v. Milton Bradley Co., 405 N.E.2d 131, 134-35 (Mass. 1980).
277. Without shareholder approval, such amendment would have been in apparent violation of
Massachusetts law.
278. Similar acceptance of the shareholder-adopted supermajority as valid under Delaware law
can be gleaned from Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978). In that case, the issue was
circumvention of a supermajority voting requirement for a merger, the validity of the supermajority
provision was apparently unquestioned.
279. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1983).
280. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 46, at 812-13.
[Vol. 47:407
HOSTILE SHARE ACQUISITIONS
legislatures, the negative inference is that no such limitation is at least
currently intended. Finally, although the potential for abuse is signifi-
cant, the original intent of greater-than-majority voting requirements
was to protect minority shareholders. It is thus quite reasonable to
conclude that the open-ended application of these statutory provisions
was, and still is, intended by state legislatures.
While it has been argued that shareholder approval of
supermajorities and other shark repellent provisions is essentially,
though perhaps not legally, ineffective due to shareholder apathy or
ignorance, 281 there is no basis to invalidate all such provisions absent
other compelling reasons. If shareholder approval, as an endorsement
of these antitakeover actions, is rejected in its entirety, all arguments
premised upon the value of corporate democracy are logically dimin-
ished in strength.282 Consistency in the application of the norms of
corporate governance requires that shareholder preference, as mani-
fested by majority adoption of defensive acts, be recognized.
Statutes which require supermajority approval for adoption of
supermajority provisions are not contrary to this result. The imposi-
tion upon majority rule created by such provisions is well within the
powers of state legislatures to alter corporate structure. Additionally,
statutes which require supermajority approval for the adoption of
supermajority provisions address the primary concern of the critics of
similar measures adopted by a mere majority of shareholders-a cur-
rent simple majority should not be able to bind a greater future major-
ity to the voting requirements. In essence, these statutes bring to
supermajorities some of the desirable characteristics of simple major-
ity voting while affording greater protection to minority shareholders.
a. Lock-Up Amendments as the Focus for Analysis
of Shark Repellents
Though majority rule is clearly the norm in modern corporate
281. See Gilson, supra note 46, at 824.
282. Gilson's position on shareholder approval is somewhat inconsistent with his desire to
further shareholder democracy. He states that: "The conclusion that shark repellent amendments
are invalid is not affected by shareholder votes that approve them." Though he does moderate this
blunt statement, he does so in the course of defining shark repellent amendments (provisions which
are more difficult to repeal than to initially adopt), identification of which secures their invalidity
regardless of share approval. Supermajority provisions and other shark repellents may have a role in
some corporate structures, and shareholder approval is an essential element of adoption in such
situations. The key is developing a consistent framework encompassing the adoption, effect and
repeal.
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governance, all major corporate statutes continue to allow the share-
holders to adopt, by charter amendment, greater-than-majority voting
requirements for shareholder action.283 This is the typical route fol-
lowed by corporate boards wishing to enact shark repellents. The mo-
dus operandi of a board made anxious by the threat of hostile
acquisition is to formulate its defenses, present them to shareholders
and then lock-in the defenses. Defenses are locked-in by amending
the charter or bylaws so that the vote required to repeal the defenses
is increased from the simple majority required for adoption to a
supermajority requirement, usually in the range of a sixty-seven to
eighty percent affirmative vote. This maneuver is known as a lock-up
provision and it is critical to the efficacy of all shareholder-adopted
antitakeover measures.
Without lock-up amendments, shark repellent defenses are an ex-
ercise with limited substantive effect. If a hostile party could amend
the corporate charter or bylaws through a mere majority vote, then
any previously-enacted shark repellent amendment could be elimi-
nated if the insurgents gained majority voting power and repealed the
amendment. No supermajority provisions would need be met; rather,
the insurgents could simply terminate the shark repellent by majority
vote. Though some would contend this result is proper,28 4 recogni-
tion of an earlier majority's power to alter the corporate structure
through changes in voting rights demands the contrary. Thus, a cur-
rent majority can lock-in charter amendments by requiring a
supermajority vote before the amendments are repealed. Though
there is conflict between the two majorities separated in time, the only
reasonable resolution of the conflict demands that the prior majority's
power be recognized.
b. Protecting Minority Interests from Majority Approved Lock-Up
of Shark Repellent Provisions
A shark repellent without a lock-up amendment, which effects
only nominal changes in the corporate structure and in the governing
powers of the corporation's constituent parties, is a valid action of the
corporation's shareholders. The validity of a lock-up provision is
283. See, eg., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(a)(5) (West Supp. 1985); DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(4) (1983); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.437 (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:5-12(1)
(West 1969); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 616(a)(2) (McKinney 1963); MODEL BUSINEsS CORP. Acr
ANN. § 7.27 (3d ed. 1985).
284. See, e.g., Gilson, supra note 46; Friedenberg, supra note 29.
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more difficult to evaluate, however, when it pits the norm of majority
rule and the enabling statute against the voting rights and investment
interests of the minority shareholders. The minority shareholders
may be bound by a shark repellent amendment without their approval
or any ability to reverse the decision. Simply stated, the problem is
whether the majority of shareholders should potentially be able to im-
pair minority interests through a charter amendment which a like
percentage of shareholders would be unable to repeal.
Although this Article has concluded that a majority must be al-
lowed to adopt and lock-in supermajority voting, courts might con-
strue such a shift in voting power as a fundamental corporate change.
If this limitation is a fundamental corporate change, then it would
trigger the minority shareholders' right to dissent and demand ap-
praisal, just as such a right would exist for other fundamental corpo-
rate changes. If shareholders who are opposed to the adoption of
shark repellents (which are accompanied by lock-up amendments) are
to be afforded full and fair protection of their voting power and other
investment interests, then they must be given the same remedies that
apply to other fundamental corporate changes, namely, appraisal
rights. Statutory language from which courts might analogize already
exists in some jurisdictions.2 8 5 That lock-up amendments should trig-
ger such rights conforms with the rationale behind the appraisal
statutes.
Appraisal statutes were designed to allow majority rule to govern
the corporation's operation, both in ordinary and extraordinary cor-
porate actions. Embodied in the concept of the appraisal statutes,
however, is the recognition that a dissenting minority will exist and
when a change occurs, either in the rights granted to the shareholders
or in the fundamental nature of the corporation, a financial safety
valve which allows the dissenting shareholders to divert their invest-
ments into other vehicles is appropriate. Allowing dissenting share-
holders to vacate the corporation may also prevent future disputes or
lawsuits. This rationale is the same as that applying to other corpo-
rate transactions triggering the right to dissent and demand
285. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.471(a)(4) (West 1985) (granting appraisal rights upon
limitation of voting powers). See also MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN. § 13.02 (3d ed. 1985).
This section establishes appraisal rights for shareholders dissenting from (1) a merger or consolida-
tion, (2) a plan of exchange, (3) the sale or exchange of substantially all corporate assets, and (4)
amendment of the articles of incorporation that (i) "alters or abolishes a preferential right of the
shares" or (ii) "excludes or limits the right of the shares to vote on any matter." (emphasis added).
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appraisal.286
V. CONCLUSION
This is an exciting time in the history of corporate governance.
Merger and acquisition activity has flourished among both large and
small companies, with hostile tender offers for several of the nation's
largest corporations attracting particular attention. The response of
the nation's corporate leaders to this phenomenon has been to consol-
idate their positions and attempt to create an atmosphere where they
can cautiously review such overtures to determine the benefits and
harms to the constituencies they represent. The speed and extent of
this thrust and parry of takeover and antitakeover activity appears to
have left courts and regulators without guidelines for evaluating the
flurry of events.
In an era when federal legislation often is seen as the answer to
all social, economic, and legal problems, the impetus is to increase the
federal regulatory framework. This Article has dissented from that
view, and also from the conclusion that current corporate manage-
ment has no appropriate role in the debate over, or the results of, the
takeover frenzy. Corporate managers are entrusted with responsibili-
ties to their shareholders and part of that responsibility is determining
the effect of a hostile share acquisition with respect to their companies
and shareholders. Adopting this position allows one to then focus on
the crucial issue of implementation: how can a balance be achieved
between, on the one hand, the duties of management to act for the
benefit of the shareholders and, on the other, the responsibilities of
management not to impinge on the shareholders' rights to control the
corporation and be treated equally?
The current takeover/antitakeover atmosphere provides an ap-
pealing opportunity for evaluating the relations within the modern
corporate structure and reaffirming several fundamental principles of
corporate governance. These principles fill the void created by the
286. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 250, at 72-74, 84-86. The merit of appraisal rights in this
situation is demonstrated by the rapid decrease in stock prices that may accompany the adoption of
anti-takeover measures. See J.M. Smucker Co. Holders Consider Anti-Takeover Step, Wall St. J.,
Aug. 1, 1985, at 8, col. 1 ("The proposal, which the jam maker characterizes as an anti-takeover
measure, has been a factor in the $7.875 decline in the company's stock price this week."); Hess,
Holders Pass Measures to Block Hostile Takeover, Wall St. J., May 10, 1985, at 13, col. 3 (Midwest
ed.); General Foods Acts to Block Any Takeover, Wall St. J., Sept. 23, 1985, at 16, col. 2; Revlon
Shares Lose Their Gloss For Investors As Firm Sets Anti-Takeover Buyback Plan, Wall St. J., Aug. 28,
1985, at 43, col. 3. But see supra note 39.
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highly-charged debate over the general propriety of "takeover" activ-
ity. This activity, and particularly the response of corporate manage-
ment, implicates norms of corporate governance that have been
almost ignored by the courts and the commentators in the current
volatile business climate.
Reaffirming the duty of corporate management (1) to undertake
traditional business decisions on the shareholders behalf, (2) to treat
shareholders of the same class equally, (3) to treat all shareholders
fairly, and (4) to respect the prerogatives of ultimate control vested in
the shareholders, provides the key to evaluating board activities in the
takeover context, as in more typical business situations. Moreover,
the norm of majority shareholder control requires the validation of
shareholder actions which diminish the marketability of the corpora-
tion and the derivative value of holders' shares. These principles pro-
vide insights and prescriptive guidelines to analyze today's business
activity.
Focusing on traditional principles of corporate governance also
highlights the extensive discretion placed in the hands of corporate
managers in the modern American business enterprise. Over the next
few years the courts will have the opportunity to limit that discretion
based on these fundamental norms of corporate operation. Their re-
sponse to the challenge presented by today's takeover frenzy will de-
fine the extent of this discretion and the structure of tomorrow's
corporation.
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